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Abstract
We study the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms and some natural extensions, for a
general setting where the valuations of the buyers are drawn from a correlated distribution. Sequential posted price
mechanisms are conceptually simple mechanisms that work by proposing a “take-it-or-leave-it” offer to each buyer.
We apply sequential posted price mechanisms to single-parameter multi-unit settings in which each buyer demands
only one item and the mechanism can assign the service to at most k of the buyers. For standard sequential posted price
mechanisms, we prove that with the valuation distribution having finite support, no sequential posted price mechanism
can extract a constant fraction of the optimal expected revenue, even with unlimited supply. We extend this result
to the the case of a continuous valuation distribution when various standard assumptions hold simultaneously (i.e.,
everywhere-supported, continuous, symmetric, and normalized (conditional) distributions that satisfy regularity, the
MHR condition, and affiliation). In fact, it turns out that the best fraction of the optimal revenue that is extractable
by a sequential posted price mechanism is proportional to ratio of the highest and lowest possible valuation. We
prove that for two simple generalizations of these mechanisms, a better revenue performance can be achieved: if the
sequential posted price mechanism has for each buyer the option of either proposing an offer or asking the buyer
for its valuation, then a Ω(1/max{1, d}) fraction of the optimal revenue can be extracted, where d denotes the degree
of dependence of the valuations, ranging from complete independence (d = 0) to arbitrary dependence (d = n − 1).
Moreover, when we generalize the sequential posted price mechanisms further, such that the mechanism has the
ability to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the ith buyer that depends on the valuations of all buyers except i’s, we
prove that a constant fraction (2 − √e)/4 ≈ 0.088 of the optimal revenue can be always extracted.
1 Introduction
A large body of literature in the field of mechanism design focuses on the design of auctions that are optimal with re-
spect some given objective function, such as maximizing the social welfare or the auctioneer’s revenue. This literature
mainly considered direct revelation mechanisms, in which each buyer submits a bid that represents his valuation for
getting the service, and the mechanism determines the winners and how much they are forced to pay. The reason for
this is the revelation principle (see, e.g., [Bo¨rgers, 2015]), which implies that one may resort to studying only direct
revelation mechanisms for many purposes, such as maximizing the social welfare or the auctioneer’s revenue. Some of
the most celebrated mechanisms follow this approach, such as the Vickrey-Clark-Groves mechanism [Vickrey, 1961,
Clarke, 1971, Groves, 1973] and the Myerson mechanism [Myerson, 1981].
A natural assumption behind these mechanisms is that buyers will submit truthfully whenever the utility they take
with the truthful bid is at least as high as the utility they may take with a different bid. However, it has often been
acknowledged that such an assumption may be too strong in a real world setting. In particular, Sandholm and Gilpin
[2004] highlight that this assumption usually fails because of: 1) a buyer’s unwillingness to fully specify their values, 2)
a buyer’s unwillingness to participate in ill understood, complex, unintuitive auction mechanisms, and 3) irrationality
of a buyer, which leads him to underbid even when it is known that there is nothing to be gained from this behavior.
This has recently motivated the research about auction mechanisms that are conceptually simple. Among these,
the class of sequential posted price mechanisms [Chawla et al., 2010] is particularly attractive. First studied by
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Sandholm and Gilpin [2004] (and called “take-it-or-leave-it mechanisms”), these mechanisms work by iteratively se-
lecting a buyer that has not been selected previously, and offering him a price. The buyer may then accept or reject
that price. When the buyer accepts, he is allocated the service. Otherwise, the mechanism does not allocate the service
to the buyer. In the sequential posted-price mechanism we allow both the choice of buyer and the price offered to
that buyer to depend on the decisions of the previously selected buyers (and the prior knowledge about the buyers’
valuations). Also, randomization in the choice of the buyer and in the charged price is allowed. Sequential posted price
mechanisms are thus conceptually simple and buyers do not have to reveal their valuations for the service. Moreover,
they possess a trivial dominant strategy (i.e., do not require any strategic decisions on the part of a buyer) and are
individually rational (i.e., informally, participation in such an auction is never harmful to the buyer).
Sequential posted price mechanisms have been mainly studied for the setting where the valuations of the buyers
are each drawn independently from publicly known buyer-specific distributions, called the independent values setting.
In this paper, we study a much more general setting, and assume that the entire vector of valuations is drawn from one
publicly known distribution, which allows for arbitrarily complex dependencies among the valuations of the buyers.
This setting is commonly known as the correlated values setting. Our goal is to investigate questions related to the
existence of sequential posted price mechanisms that achieve a high revenue. That is, we quantify the quality of a
mechanism by comparing its expected revenue to that of the optimal mechanism: the mechanism that achieves the
highest expected revenue among all dominant strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mecha-
nisms (see the definitions in Section 2 below).
We assume a standard Bayesian, transferable, quasi-linear utility model and we study a unit demand, single param-
eter, multi-unit setting: there is one service (or type of item) being provided by the auctioneer, any buyer is interested
in receiving the service once, and the valuation of each buyer consists of a single number that reflects to what extent
a buyer would profit from receiving the service provided by the auctioneer. The auctioneer can charge a price to a
bidder, so that the utility of a bidder is his valuation (in case he gets the service), minus the charged price. We focus
in this paper on the k-limited supply setting, where service can be provided to at most k of the buyers. This is an
important setting because it is a natural constraint in many realistic scenarios, and it contains two fundamental special
cases: the unit supply setting (where k = 1), and the unlimited supply setting where k = n.
Related work There has been recent substantial work on the subject of revenue performance for simple mecha-
nisms [Hartline and Roughgarden, 2009, Hart and Nisan, 2012, Babaioff et al., 2014, Rubinstein and Weinberg, 2015,
Devanur et al., 2015]. In particular, Babaioff et al. [2014] highlight the importance of understanding what is the rela-
tive strength of simple versus complex mechanisms with regard to revenue maximization.
As described above, sequential posted price mechanisms are an example of such a simple class of mechanisms.
Sandholm and Gilpin [2004] have been the first ones to study sequential posted price mechanisms. They give ex-
perimental results for the case in which values are independently drawn from the uniform distribution in [0, 1].
Moreover, they consider the case where multiple offers can be made to a bidder, and study the equilibria that arise
from this. Blumrosen and Holenstein [2008] compare fixed price (called symmetric auctions), sequential posted price
(called discriminatory auctions) and the optimal mechanism for valuations drawn from a wide class of i.i.d distri-
butions. Babaioff et al. [2012] consider prior-independent posted price mechanisms with k-limited supply for the
setting where the only information known about the valuation distribution is that all valuations are independently
drawn from the same distribution with support [0, 1]. Posted-price mechanisms have also been previously studied in
[Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003, Blum and Hartline, 2005, Blum et al., 2004], albeit for a non-Bayesian, on-line set-
ting. In a recent work Feldman et al. [2015] study “on-line” posted price mechanisms for combinatorial auctions when
valuations are independently drawn.
The works of Chawla et al. [2010] and Gupta and Nagarajan [2013] are closest to our present work, although they
only consider sequential posted price mechanisms in the independent values setting. In particular, Chawla et al. [2010]
prove that such mechanisms can extract a constant factor of the optimal revenue for single and multiple parameter set-
tings under various constraints on the allocations. They also consider order-oblivious (i.e., “on-line”) sequential posted
price mechanisms in which the order in which the order of the buyers is fixed and adversarially determined. They use
order-oblivious mechanisms in order to establish some results for the more general multi-parameter case. Yan [2011]
builds on this work and strengthens some of the results of Chawla et al. [2010]. Moreover, Kleinberg and Weinberg
[2012] prove results that imply a strengthening of some of the results of Chawla et al. [2010].
Gupta and Nagarajan [2013] introduce a more abstract stochastic probing problem that includes Bayesian sequen-
tial posted price mechanisms as well as the stochastic matching problem introduced by Chen et al. [2009]. Their
approximation bounds were later improved by Adamczyk et al. [2014] who in particular matched the approximation
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of Chawla et al. [2010] for single matroid settings.
All previous work only consider the independent setting. In this work we instead focus on the correlated set-
ting. The lookahead mechanism of Ronen [2001] is a fundamental reference for the correlated setting and resem-
bles our blind auction mechanism but is different in substantial ways as we will soon indicate. Cremer and McLean
[1988] made a fundamental contribution to auction theory in the correlated value setting, by characterizing exactly
for which valuation distributions it is possible to extract the full optimal social welfare as revenue. They do this
for the ex-post IC, interim IR mechanisms and for the dominant strategy IC, interim IR mechanisms. Segal [2003]
give a characterization of optimal ex-post incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational optimal mechanisms.
Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] study optimal mechanism design in the even more general interdependent
setting. They show how to extend the Myerson mechanism to this setting for various assumptions on the valuation
distribution. There is now a substantial literature [Dobzinski et al., 2011, Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2013,
Chawla et al., 2014], that develop mechanisms with good approximation guarantees for revenue maximization in the
correlated setting. These mechanisms build on the lookahead mechanism of Ronen [2001] and thus they also differ
from the mechanisms proposed in this work.
Contributions and outline We define some preliminaries and notation in Section 2. In Section 3.1 we give a simple
sequence of instances which demonstrates that for unrestricted correlated distributions the expected revenue of the
best sequential posted price mechanism does not approximate within any constant factor the expected revenue of the
optimal dominant strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanism. This holds for any value
of k (i.e, the size of the supply). We extend this impossibility result by proving that a constant approximation is im-
possible to achieve even when we assume that the valuation distribution is continuous and satisfies all of the following
conditions simultaneously: the valuation distribution is supported everywhere, is entirely symmetric, satisfies regular-
ity, satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, satisfies affiliation, all the induced marginal distributions have finite
expectation, and all the conditional marginal distributions are non-zero everywhere.
The maximum revenue that a sequential posted price mechanism can generate on our examples is shown to be
characterized by the logarithm of the ratio between the highest and lowest valuations in the support of the distribution.
We show in Section 3.2 that this approximation ratio is essentially tight.
Given these negative results, we consider a generalization of sequential posted price mechanisms that are more
suitable for settings with limited dependence among the buyers’ valuations: enhanced sequential posted price mech-
anisms. An enhanced sequential posted price mechanism works by iteratively selecting a buyer that has not been
selected previously. The auctioneer can either offer the selected buyer a price or ask him to report his valuation. As
in sequential posted price mechanisms, if the buyer is offered a price, then he may accept or reject that price. When
the buyer accepts, he is allocated the service. Otherwise, the mechanism does not allocate the service to the buyer. If
instead, the buyer is asked to report his valuation, then the mechanism does not allocate him the service. Note that
the enhanced sequential posted price mechanism requires that some fraction of buyers reveal their valuation truthfully.
Thus, the original property that the bidders not have to reveal their preferences is partially sacrificed, in return for a
more powerful class of mechanisms and (as we will see) a better revenue performance. For practical implementation
such mechanisms can be slightly adjusted by providing a bidder with a small monetary reward in case he is asked to
reveal his valuation1.
For the enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms, we prove that again there are instances in which the revenue
is not within a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. However, we show that this class of mechanisms can extract
a fraction Θ(1/n) of the optimal revenue, i.e., a fraction that is independent of the valuation distribution.
This result seems to suggest that to achieve a constant approximation of the optimal revenue it is necessary to
collect all the bids truthfully. Consistent with this hypothesis, we prove that a constant fraction of the optimal revenue
can be extracted by a dominant strategy IC blind offer mechanisms: these mechanisms inherit all the limitations of
sequential posted price mechanisms (i.e., buyers are considered sequentially in an order independent of the bids; it is
possible to offer a price to a buyer only when selected; and the buyer gets the service only if it accepts the offered
price), except that the price offered to a bidder i may now depend on the bids submitted by all players other than
i. This generalization sacrifices entirely the property that buyers valuations need not be revealed, and the class of
blind offer mechanisms are thus necessarily direct revelation mechanisms. However, this comes with the reward of
a revenue that is only a constant factor away from optimal. Also, blind offer mechanisms preserve the conceptual
1We also note that in some realistic scenarios, the valuation of some buyers may be known a priori to the auctioneer (through, for example,
the repetition of auctions or accounting and profiling operations), which can be exploited accordingly in the design of the enhanced posted price
mechanism.
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simplicity of sequential posted price mechanisms, and are easy to grasp for the buyers participating in the auction: in
particular, buyers have a conceptually simple and practical strategy, to accept the price if and only if it is not above
their valuation, regardless of how the prices are computed. Unfortunately it turns out that blind offer mechanisms
are not inherently truthful, although this is only for a subtle reason: while it is true that a buyer cannot influence the
price he is offered nor the decision of the mechanism to pick him, he can still be incentivized to misreport in order
to influence the probability that the supply has not run out before the buyer is picked. However, this is not a big
obstruction, as we will show that there is a straightforward way to turn any blind offer mechanism into an incentive
compatible one. We stress that, even if blind offer mechanisms sacrifice some simplicity (and practicality), we still
find it theoretically interesting that a mechanism that on-line allocates items to buyers (i.e., in any order ) and thus
not necessarily allocating the items to agents maximizing their profit,say as in Ronen [2001] and Chawla et al. [2010])
is able to achieve a constant approximation of the optimal revenue even with correlated valuations. Moreover, our
result for blind offer mechanisms has a constructive purpose: it provides the intermediate step en route to establishing
revenue approximation bounds for other mechanisms. We will show how blind offer mechanisms serve to this purpose
in Section 4 for the construction of enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms.
We highlight that our positive results do not make any assumptions on the marginal valuation distributions of the
buyers nor the type of correlation among the buyers. However, in Section 4 we consider the case in which the degree
of dependence among the buyers is limited. In particular, we introduce the notion of d-dimensionally dependent
distributions. This notion informally requires that for each buyer i there is a set S i of d other buyers such that the
distribution of i’s valuation when conditioning on the vector of other buyers’ valuations can likewise be obtained by
only conditioning on the valuations of S i. Thus, this notion induces a hierarchy of n classes of valuation distributions
with increasing degrees of dependence among the buyers: for d = 0 the buyers have independent valuations, while
the other extreme d = n − 1 implies that the valuations may be dependent in arbitrarily complex ways. Note that
d-dimensional dependence does not require that the marginal valuation distributions of the buyers themselves satisfy
any particular property, and neither does it require anything from the type of correlation that may exist among the
buyers. This stands in contrast with commonly made assumptions such as symmetry, affiliation, the monotone-hazard
rate assumption, and regularity, that are often encountered in the auction theory and mechanism design literature.
Our main positive result for enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms then states that when the valuation
distribution is d-dimensionally dependent, there exists an enhanced sequential posted price mechanism that extracts
an Ω(1/d) fraction of the optimal revenue. The proof of this result consists of three key ingredients:
• An upper bound on the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR revenue in terms of the solution of a linear program. This
upper bound has the form of a relatively simple expression that is important for the definition and analysis of
a blind offer mechanism that we define subsequently. This part of the proof generalizes a linear programming
characterization introduced by Gupta and Nagarajan [2013] for the independent distribution setting.
• A proof for the fact that incentive compatible blind offer mechanisms are powerful enough to extract a constant
fraction of the optimal revenue of any instance. This makes crucial use of the linear program mentioned above.
• A conversion lemma showing that blind offer mechanisms can be turned into enhanced sequential posted price
mechanisms while maintaining a fraction Ω(1/d) of the revenue of the blind offer mechanism2.
While our focus is on proving the (non-)existence of simple mechanisms that perform well in terms of revenue,
we note the following about the computational complexity of our mechanisms: all the mechanisms that we use in our
positive results run in polynomial time when the valuation distribution is given as a description of the valuation vectors
together with their probability mass3.
Additionally, we note that all of our negative results hold for randomized mechanisms. On the other hand: our
positive results only require randomization in a limited way. For our positive results for classical sequential posted
price mechanisms, only the offered prices need to be randomly chosen, while the order in which the agents are picked
is arbitrary. This makes these positive results hold through for the order-oblivious (i.e., on-line) setting in which the
mechanism has no control over the agent that is picked in each iteration. Our positive result for blind offer mechanisms
only requires randomized pricing in case k < n and works for any ordering in which the agents are picked, as long as
2The sequential posted price mechanism constructed in this lemma depends on a parameter q which can be adjusted to trade off the amount of
valuation elicitation against the hidden constant in the Ω(1/d) expression.
3When the valuation distribution is not accessible in such a form, and can instead only be sampled from, then standard sampling techniques can
be used in order to obtain an estimate of the distribution. When this estimate is reasonably accurate (which should be the case when the distribution
in question does not have extreme outliers), then the mechanisms in our paper can still be used with only a small additional loss in revenue.
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the mechanisms knows the ordering in advance. Our positive result for enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms
requires randomized pricing and the assumption that the mechanism can pick a uniformly random ordering of the
agents (i.e., holds in the random order model ROM of arrivals).
Some of the proofs have been omitted in the main body of the paper. In some occasions we have replaced them by
proof sketches. In all of these cases the full versions of the proofs can be found in Appendix F.
2 Preliminaries and notation
For a ∈ N, we write [a] to denote the set {1, . . . , a}. We write 1[X] to denote the indicator function for property X (i.e.,
it evaluates to 1 if X holds, and to 0 otherwise). When ~v is a vector and a is an arbitrary element, we denote by (a,~v−i)
the vector obtained by replacing vi with a.
We face a setting where an auctioneer provides a service to n buyers, and is able to serve at most k of the buyers.
As mentioned in the introduction, the buyers have valuations for the service offered, which are drawn from a valuation
distribution, defined as follows.
Definition 1 (Valuation distribution). A valuation distribution π for n buyers is a probability distribution on Rn≥0.
We will assume throughout this paper that π is discrete, except for in Theorem 2. In that proposition we assume that
some standard assumptions about continuous valuation distributions hold, such as regularity, the monotone hazard rate
(MHR) condition and affiliation. We refer the interested reader to Appendix A for a definition and a brief discussion
of these properties.
We will use the following notation for conditional and marginal probability distributions. For an arbitrary probabil-
ity distribution π, denote by supp(π) the support of π. Let π be a discrete finite probability distribution onRn, let i ∈ [n],
S ⊂ [n] and ~v ∈ Rn. We denote by ~vS the vector obtained by removing from ~v the coordinates in [n] \ S . We denote
by πS the probability distribution induced by drawing a vector from π and removing the coordinates corresponding to
index set [n] \ S . If S = {i} is a singleton, we write πi instead of π{i} and if S consists of all but one buyer i, we write
π−i instead of π[n]\{i}. We denote by π~vS the probability distribution of π conditioned on the event that ~vS is the vector
of values on the coordinates corresponding to index set S . We denote by πi,~vS the marginal probability distribution of
the coordinate of π~vS that corresponds to buyer i. Again, in these cases, in the subscript we will also write i instead of
{i} and −i instead of [n] \ {i}.
Each of the buyers is interested in receiving the service at most once. The auctioneer runs a mechanism with
which the buyers interact. In general, a mechanism consists of a specification of (i.) the strategies available to the
buyers, (ii.) a function that maps each vector of strategies chosen by the buyers to an outcome. The mechanism, when
provided with a strategy profile of the buyers, outputs an outcome that consists of a vector ~x = (x1, . . . , xn) and a
vector ~p = (p1, . . . , pn): vector ~x is the allocation vector, i.e., the (0, 1)-vector that indicates to which of the buyers the
auctioneer allocates the service, and ~p = (p1, . . . , pn) is the vector of prices that the auctioneer asks from the buyers.
For outcome (~x, ~p), the utility of a buyer i ∈ [n] is xivi − pi. The auctioneer is interested in maximizing the revenue∑
i∈[n] pi, and is assumed to have full knowledge of the valuation distribution, but not of the actual valuations of the
buyers.
We formalize the above as follows.
Definition 2. An instance is a triple (n, π, k), where n is the number of participating buyers, π is the valuation distribu-
tion, and k ∈ N≥1 is the amount of services that the auctioneer may allocate to the buyers. A deterministic mechanism
f is a function from ×i∈[n]Σi to {0, 1}n × Rn≥0, for any choice of strategy sets Σi, i ∈ [n]. When Σi = supp(πi) for all
i ∈ [n], mechanism f is called a deterministic direct revelation mechanism. A randomized mechanism M is a proba-
bility distribution over deterministic mechanisms. For i ∈ [n] and ~s ∈ × j∈[n]Σ j, we will denote i’s expected allocation
E f∼M[ f (~s)i] by xi(~s) and i’s expected payment E f∼M[ f (~s)n+i] by pi(~s). (When we use this notation, the mechanism M
will always be clear from context.)
Definition 3. Let (n, π, k) be an instance and M be a randomized direct revelation mechanism for that instance.
Mechanism M is dominant strategy incentive compatible (dominant strategy IC) iff for all i ∈ [n] and ~s ∈ × j∈[n]supp(π j)
and ~v ∈ supp(π),
xi(vi, ~s−i)vi − pi(vi, ~s−i) ≥ xi(~s)vi − pi(~s).
Mechanism M is ex-post individually rational (ex-post IR) iff for all i ∈ [n] and ~s ∈ supp(π),
xi(s)vi − pi(s) ≥ 0.
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For convenience we usually will not treat a mechanism as a probability distribution over outcomes, but rather as
the result of a randomized procedure that interacts in some way with the buyers. In this case we say that a mechanism
is implemented by that procedure. The sequential posted price mechanisms are defined to be the mechanisms that are
implemented by a particular such procedure, defined as follows.
Definition 4. An sequential posted price mechanism for an instance (n, π, k) is any mechanism that is implementable
by iteratively selecting a buyer i ∈ [n] that has not been selected in a previous iteration, and proposing a price pi for
the service, which the buyer may accept or reject. If i accepts, he gets the service and pays pi, resulting in a utility of
vi − pi for i. If i rejects, he pays nothing and does not get the service, resulting in a utility of 0 for i. Once the number
of buyers that have accepted an offer equals k, the process terminates. Randomization in the selection of the buyers
and prices is allowed.
We will initially be concerned with only sequential posted price mechanisms. Later in the paper we define and
study the two generalizations of sequential posted price mechanisms that we mentioned in the introduction.
Note that each buyer in a sequential posted price mechanism has an obvious dominant strategy: He will accept
whenever the price offered to him does not exceed his valuation, and he will reject otherwise. Also, a buyer always
ends up with a non-negative utility when participating in a sequential posted price mechanism. Thus, by the revelation
principle (see, e.g., [Bo¨rgers, 2015]), a sequential posted price mechanism can be straightforwardly converted into a
dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR direct revelation mechanism that achieves the same expected revenue.
Our interest lies in analyzing the revenue performance of sequential posted price mechanisms. We do this by
comparing the expected revenue of such mechanisms to the maximum expected revenue that can be obtained by a
mechanism that satisfies dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR. Thus, for a given instance let OPT be the maximum
expected revenue that can be attained by a dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism and let REV(C) be the max-
imum expected revenue achievable by some class of mechanisms C. Our goal throughout this paper is to derive
instance-independent lower and upper bounds on the ratio REV(C)/OPT , when C is the class of sequential posted
price mechanisms or one of the generalizations mentioned.
A more general class of mechanisms is formed by the ex-post incentive compatible, ex-post individually rational
mechanisms.
Definition 5. Let (n, π, k) be an instance and M be a randomized direct revelation mechanism for that instance.
Mechanism M is ex-post incentive compatible (ex-post IC) iff for all i ∈ [n], si ∈ supp(πi) and ~v ∈ supp(π),
xi(~v)vi − pi(~v) ≥ xi(si,~v−i)vi − pi(si,~v−i).
In other words, a mechanism is ex-post IC if it is a pure equilibrium for the buyers to always report their valuation.
In this work we sometimes compare the expected revenue of our (dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR) mechanisms
to the maximum expected revenue of the more general class of ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanisms. This strengthens
our positive results. We refer the interested reader to Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] for a further discussion
of and comparison between various solution concepts.
3 Sequential posted price mechanisms
We are interested in designing a posted price mechanism that, for any given n and valuation distribution π, achieves
an expected revenue that lies only a constant factor away from the optimal expected revenue that can be achieved
by a dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism. In this section we show that this is unfortunately impossible. In
fact, we will show that the approximation ratios established in this section are asymptotically optimal in terms of a
distributional parameter to be defined in section 3.2.
3.1 Non-existence of good posted price mechanisms
We next prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For all n ∈ N≥2, there exists a valuation distribution π such that for all k ∈ [n] there does not exist a
sequential posted price mechanism for instance (n, π, k) that extracts a constant fraction of the expected revenue of the
optimal dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
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Proof. We first consider the unit supply setting, i.e., instances of the form (n, π, 1). As a first step, we show that it is
impossible to achieve a constant factor approximation when we compare a posted price mechanism to the expected
expected optimal social welfare, defined as:
OS W = E~v∼π[max{vi : i ∈ [n]}].
Let OR be the optimal revenue that a dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR mechanism can achieve. (Of course
OR depends on the valuation distribution π, but we assume that the valuation distribution is given, and implicit from
context.) It is clear that OS W is an upper bound to OR regardless of π, since a dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR
mechanism will not charge (in expectation) any buyer a higher price than its expected valuation.
Fix m ∈ N≥1 arbitrarily, and consider the case where n = 1 and the valuation v1 of the single buyer is taken from
{1/a : a ∈ [m]} distributed such that π1(1/a) = 1/m for all a ∈ [m]. In this setting, a posted price mechanism will offer
the buyer a price p, which the buyer subsequently accepts iff v1 ≥ p. After that, the mechanism terminates.
Note that OS W = 1
m
∑m
a=1
1
a
. The expected revenue of the mechanism is
RM = pPrv1∼π1 [v1 ≥ p] = p
|{a : 1/a ≥ p}|
m
=
|{a : 1/a ≥ 1/p−1}|
mp−1
=
p−1
mp−1
=
1
m
. (1)
Therefore:
lim
m→∞
RM
OS W
= lim
m→∞
1∑
a∈[m] 1/a
=
1
H(m) = 0.
So, no posted price mechanism can secure in expectation a revenue that lies a constant factor away from the expected
optimal social welfare. (Because our analysis is for an instance instance with only one buyer, this inapproximability
result also holds for instances with independent valuations.)
We extend the above example in a simple way to a setting where the expected revenue of the optimal dominant
strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism is equal to the expected optimal social welfare.
Fix m ∈ N≥1 and consider a setting with 2 buyers, where the type vector (v1, v2) takes values in {(1/a, 1/a) : a ∈ [m]}
according to the probability distribution where π((1/a, 1/a)) = 1/m for all a ∈ [m]. A mechanism that always gives
buyer 1 the service, and charges buyer 1 the bid of buyer 2, is clearly dominant strategy IC and also clearly achieves a
revenue equal to the optimal social welfare.
In this two buyer setting, the value OS W is again OS W = 1
m
∑m
a=1
1
a
. By symmetry, we may assume without loss of
generality that a posted price mechanism works by first proposing a price p1 to buyer 1, and then proposing a price p2
to buyer 2 if buyer 1 rejected the offer. Using arguments similar to (1), we derive that the revenue of this mechanism
is:
RM = p1Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 ≥ p1] + p2Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 < p1 ∩ v2 ≥ p2]
=
1
m
+ p2Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 < p1 ∩ v2 ≥ p2] ≤
1
m
+ p2Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v2 ≥ p2] =
2
m
.
Therefore:
lim
m→∞
RM
OR = limm→∞
RM
OS W ≤ limm→∞
2∑
a∈[m] 1/a
= 0.
The above example establishes the non-existence of a good sequential posted price mechanism in the case where
the service has to be provided to a single buyer. Suppose now that the service can be provided to 2 buyers, and
each buyer gets the service at most once. Consider again two buyers whose values are drawn from the probability
distribution π as defined above. As above, by symmetry we may assume that our posted price mechanism first proposes
price p1 to buyer 1, and then proposes either price p2 or p′2 to buyer 2: p2 is proposed in case the offer was rejected
by buyer 1, and p′2 is proposed otherwise. The difference with the previous analysis for the unit supply case is that the
mechanism proposes a price to buyer 2 regardless of whether buyer 1 accepted the offer or not.
We derive:
RM = p1Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 ≥ p1 ∩ v2 < p′2] + p2Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 < p1 ∩ v2 ≥ p2]
+ (p1 + p′2)Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 ≥ p1 ∩ v2 ≥ p′2]
≤ 2
m
+ (p1 + p′2)Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 ≥ p1 ∩ v2 ≥ p′2]
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≤ 2
m
+ 2 max{p1, p′2}Pr(v1,v2)∼π[v1 ≥ max{p1, p′2}] ≤
4
m
.
The optimal incentive compatible mechanism works by giving the service to both buyers while charging the bid of
buyer 1 to buyer 2, and charging the bid of buyer 2 to buyer 1. The resulting expected revenue is exactly the expected
optimal social welfare: OR = OS W = 1
m
∑m
a=1
2
a
. We therefore obtain
lim
m→∞
RM
OR
= lim
m→∞
RM
OS W
≤ lim
m→∞
4∑
a∈[m] 2/a
= 0.
The above yields an impossibility result for 2-limited supply. By adding to this instance dummy buyers that always
have valuation 0, we obtain an impossibility result for k-limited supply, where k ∈ N. 
We prove that the above impossibility result holds also in the continuous case even if we assume that all of the
following conditions simultaneously hold: the valuation distribution is supported everywhere, is entirely symmetric,
satisfies regularity, satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition, satisfies affiliation, all the induced marginal distri-
butions have finite expectation, and all the conditional marginal distributions are non-zero everywhere. We remark
that Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] showed that when all these assumptions are simultaneously satisfied, the
optimal ex-post IC and ex-post IR mechanism is the Myerson mechanism, that is the same mechanism that is optimal
in the independent value setting. Thus, these conditions make the correlated setting very similar to the independent
one with respect to revenue maximization. Yet our result show that, whereas posted price mechanism can achieve a
constant approximation revenue in the latter setting, this result does not extend to the former one.
Theorem 2. There exists a valuation distribution π such that
1. π has support [0, 1]n;
2. the expectation E~v∼π[vi] is finite for any i ∈ [n];
3. π is symmetric in all its arguments;
4. π is continuous and nowhere zero on [0, 1]n;
5. the conditional marginal densities πi|~v−i are nowhere zero for any ~v−i ∈ [0, 1]n−1 and any i ∈ [n];
6. π has a monotone hazard rate and is regular;
7. π satisfies affiliation.
for which there does not exist a sequential posted price mechanism in which valuations are distributed according to
π that extracts more than a constant fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR
mechanism.
Proof. Consider c > 1 and m ≥ (c − log c)/2 and set M = 1 + 1/m. Let V be a random variable whose value is drawn
over the support [1/m, 1] according to the probability density function
fV (x) = 1(m − 1)x2 .
Let N1 and N2 be two random variables whose values are independently drawn over the support [0, M − v] according
to the conditional density function
fN|V (z | V = v) = c
−z ln(c)
Z(v)
with c > 1 and Z(v) = 1 − c−(M−v). Finally, let f be the probability density function of the pair (X, Y) = (V + N1 −
1/m,V + N2 − 1/m).
Properties 1, 2 and 3 are trivial and can be immediately checked.
For v ∈ [0, 1], let fX |V (·|V = v) and fY |V (·|V = v) be respectively the probability density functions of X and Y
conditioned on the event that V = v. In order to establish the remaining properties, observe that fX |V (x | V = v) =
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fN|V (x − v + 1/m | V = v) if x + 1/m ≥ v and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, fY |V (y | V = v) = fN|V (y − v + 1/m | V = v) if
y + 1/m ≥ v and 0 otherwise. Consider now the triple (X, Y,V). The joint density function of this triple is
fX,Y,V (x, y, v) = fX |Y,V (x | Y = y,V = v) · fY |V (y | V = v) · fV (v).
Note that fX |Y,V (x | Y = y,V = v) = fX |V(x | V = v) if min{x, y} + 1/m ≥ v and 0 otherwise. Then
fX,Y,V (x, y, v) = fN|V (x − v + 1/m | V = v) · fN|V (y − v + 1/m | V = v) · fV (v).
if min{x, y} + 1/m ≥ v and 0 otherwise. Hence, we can compute f as follows:
f (x, y) =
∫ 1
1/m
fX,Y,V (x, y, v)dv = ln
2(c)
m − 1 · c
−(x+y) ·
∫ α+1/m
1/m
c2v
v2Z(v)2 dv,
where α = min {1 − 1/m, x, y}. Note that the integrated function is continuous and positive in the interval in which it is
integrated. Hence, the integral turns out to be non-zero. From this, we observe that f (x, y) is continuous and nowhere
zero on [0, 1]2, satisfying Property 4.
Let us now derive the conditional probability density functions. By symmetry it will be sufficient to focus only on
fX |Y .
fX |Y (x | Y = y) =
∫ 1
1/m
fX |Y,V (x | Y = y,V = v) · fV (v)dv = ln(c)
m − 1 · c
−x ·
∫ α+1/m
1/m
cv
v2Z(v)dv
=
m2cM ln(c)
m − 1 · c
−x ·
∫ α
0
1
(mz + 1)2(c1−z − 1)dz.
It is now obvious that the conditional probability density functions are continuous and nowhere zero, as desired by
Property 5.
Let γ(z) = 1/((mz + 1)2(c1−z − 1)), g(a) =
∫ a
0 γ(z)dz with a ∈ [0, 1] and let α′ = min{y, 1 − 1/m}. Then
fX |Y(x | Y = y) = m
2cM ln(c)
m − 1 · c
−x ·

g(x), if x < α′;
g(α′), otherwise.
Moreover, we have that
1 − FX |Y(x | Y = y) =
∫ 1
x
fX |Y (z | Y = y)dz
=
m2cM ln(c)
m − 1 ·

∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz + g(α′)
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz, if x < α′;
g(α′)
∫ 1
x
c−zdz = g(α
′)(c−x−c−1)
ln(c) , otherwise.
Hence, the inverse hazard rate is
I(x) = 1 − FX |Y(x | Y = y)fX |Y(x | Y = y) =

∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz+g(α′)
∫ 1
α′ c
−zdz
c−xg(x) , if x < α
′;
1−cx−1
ln(c) , otherwise.
We prove that I(x) is non-increasing in x in the interval [0, 1] and thus f has the monotone hazard rate and is, as a
consequence, regular, as required by Property 6.
Clearly, I(x) is non-increasing in x in the interval [α′, 1] since in this case I(x) = (1 − cx−1)/ ln(c). Moreover, I(x)
does not have discontinuities for x = α′. So, it is sufficient to show that I(x) in non-increasing also in the interval
[0, α′]. To this aim, observe that for x < α′,
dI(x)
dx =
d
dx
∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz + g(α′)
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz
c−xg(x)
=
(
c−xg(x) ddx
∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz −
∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz ddxc
−xg(x)
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+c−xg(x)g(α′) ddx
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz − g(α′)
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz ddxc
−xg(x)
)
/(c−xg(x))2.
Observe that, according to the second fundamental theorem of calculus,
d
dx
∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz = −c−xg(x),
whereas
d
dxc
−xg(x) = c−xγ(x) − c−xg(x) ln(c),
and ddx
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz = 0. Then,
dI(x)
dx = −1 +
(
ln(c) − γ(x)
g(x)
) ∫ α′
x
c−zg(z)dz + g(α′)
∫ 1
α′
c−zdz
c−xg(x) = −1 +
(
ln(c) − γ(x)
g(x)
)
I(x).
The result then follows by showing that γ(x)/g(x) ≥ ln(c).
To this aim, let us consider the function γ′(z) = cz(c1−z − 1)(mz + 1)2 for z ∈ [0, x]. Note that
dγ′(z)
dz = 2mc(mz + 1)
(
1 − 2m + mz log c + log c
c1−z
)
≤ 2mc(mz + 1)
(
1 − 2m + log c
c
)
≤ 0,
where we used the fact that m ≥ (c − log c)/2. Thus, γ′(z) is non-increasing in its argument and, in particular,
γ′(z) ≥ γ′(x) ≥ (cx − 1)(c1−x − 1)(mx + 1)2.
By simple algebraic manipulation, it then follows that γ(z) ≤ γ(x)cz/(cx − 1). Then
γ(x)
g(x) =
γ(x)∫ x
0 γ(z)dz
≥ γ(x)∫ x
0
cz
cx−1γ(x)dz
=
cx − 1∫ x
0 c
zdz
= ln(c),
as desired.
Set now C = ln2(c)/(m − 1) and let h(a) =
∫ min{1−1/m,a}+1/m
1/m
c2v
v2Z(v)2 dv with a ∈ [0, 1]. Note that integrated function
is positive for any v ∈ [1/m, 1]. Hence, the integral increases as the size of the interval in which it is defined increases.
In other word, the function h(a) is non-decreasing in a.
Consider now the two pairs (x, y) and (x′, y′). Moreover, let xˆ = max{x, x′} and xˇ = min{x, x′} and, similarly,
define yˆ and yˇ. We show that f (x, y) f (x′, y′) ≤ f (xˆ, yˆ) f (xˇ, yˇ), satisfying in this way also Property 7.
Indeed,
f (x, y) f (x′, y′) = C2c−(x+y+x′+y′)h(min{x, y})h(min{x′, y′}).
If x ≥ x′ and y ≥ y′ (x < x′ and y < y′, respectively), then (xˆ, yˆ) = (x, y) ((x′, y′), resp.) and (xˇ, yˇ) = (x′, y′) ((x, y),
resp.), and the desired result immediately follows. Suppose instead that (xˆ, yˆ) = (x, y′) and (xˇ, yˇ) = (x′, y). Then
f (xˆ, yˆ) f (xˇ, yˇ) = C2c−(x+y+x′+y′)h(min{x, y′})h(min{x′, y}).
We will prove that in this case h(min{x, y})h(min{x′, y′}) ≤ h(min{x, y′})h(min{x′, y}). First observe that on both
sides one of the two factors must be h(min{x, y, x′, y′}) = h(min{x′, y}). Suppose without loss of generality, that
min{x′, y} = y. Then it is sufficient to prove that h(min{x′, y′}) ≤ h(min{x, y′}), or, since h in non-decreasing, that
min{x′, y′} ≤ min{x, y′}. If x ≤ y′, then x′ ≤ x ≤ y′ by hypothesis and the claim follows. If y′ < x, then it immediately
follows that min{x′, y′} ≤ y′. The case that (xˆ, yˆ) = (x′, y) and (xˇ, yˇ) = (x, y′) is similar and hence omitted.
Finally, observe that limc→∞ fN|V (0 | V = v) = 1 and limc→∞ fN|V (z | V = v) = 0 for any z > 0. Hence,
limc→∞ X = limc→∞ Y = V − 1/m.
Let us consider the case that the service can be offered to only one buyer. In this setting, the following is a dominant
strategy IC and ex-post IR mechanism: it offers to buyer 1 the service at a price of the valuation of buyer 2 minus
a fixed constant ǫ. For small enough c, ǫ can be chosen arbitrarily small. Thus, for any ǫ there exists a choice of c
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such that in expectation this mechanism extracts as revenue all but ǫ of the social welfare. The expected optimal social
welfare (and thus the optimal expected revenue) is:
OR = OS W = Ev∼ fV [v − 1/m] =
∫ 1
1/m
v − 1/m
(m − 1)v2 dv =
ln(m)
m − 1 −
1
m
≥ ln(m − 1)
m − 1 .
A posted price mechanism will offer buyer 1 a price p1 ≥ 0, which the buyer subsequently accepts iff X ≥ p1. After
that, if buyer 1 rejects, the mechanism offers a price p2 to buyer 2. Thus, if p1 ∈ [0, 1 − 1/m], then
p1Prv∼ fV [X ≥ p1] = p1Prv∼ fV [v ≥ p1 + 1/m]
= p1
∫ 1
p1+1/m
1
(m − 1)v2 dv =
p1
m − 1
(
1
p1 + 1/m
− 1
)
≤ 1 − p1
m − 1 ≤
1
m − 1 .
Moreover, if p1 ≥ 1 − 1/m, then p1Prv∼ f [X ≥ p1] = 0. Hence,
RM = p1Prv∼ f [v ≥ p1] + p2Prv∼ f [v < p1 ∩ v ≥ p2] ≤
1
m − 1 + p2Prv∼ f [v ≥ p2] ≤
2
m − 1 .
Therefore:
lim
m→∞
RM
OR
= lim
m→∞
RM
OS W
≤ lim
m→∞
2
ln(m − 1) = 0.
The case in which it can be offered to both buyer is similar and omitted. 
We note that above theorem can be easily extended to a any number of buyers, by adding dummy buyers whose
valuation is independently drawn over the support [0, 1] according to the probability density function
f (x) = c
−x ln c
1 − c−1 .
Note that, with this extension, the resulting distribution π does not satisfy the symmetry condition anymore. In the
result of Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013], symmetry is not necessary for the optimality of the Myerson mech-
anism to hold.
3.2 A revenue guarantee for sequential posted price mechanisms
In the previous section we have demonstrated that it is impossible to have a sequential posted price mechanism extract
a constant fraction of the optimal revenue. More precisely, in our example instances it was the case that the expected
revenue extracted by every posted price mechanism is a Θ(1/ log(r)) fraction of the optimal expected revenue, where r
is the ratio between the highest valuation and the lowest valuation in the support of the valuation distribution. A natural
question that arises is whether this is the worst possible instance in terms of revenue extracted, as a function of r. We
show here that this is indeed the case, asymptotically: For every valuation distribution π, there exists a mechanism
that extracts in expectation at least a Θ(1/ log(r)) fraction of the revenue of the optimal revenue. We note that in many
realistic scenarios, we do not expect the extremal valuations of the buyers to lie too far from each other, because often
the valuation of a buyer is strongly impacted by prior objective knowledge of the value of the service to be auctioned.
The results of this section are valuable when that is the case.
We start with the unit supply case.
Definition 6. For a valuation distribution π on Rn, let vmaxπ and vminπ be max{vi : v ∈ supp(π), i ∈ [n]} and
min{max{vi : i ∈ [n]} : v ∈ supp(π)} respectively. Let rπ = vmaxπ /vminπ be the ratio between the highest and lowest
coordinate-wise maximum valuation in the support of π.
Proposition 1. Let n ∈ N≥1, and let π be a probability distribution on Rn. For the unit supply case there exists a
sequential posted price mechanism that, when run on instance (n, π, 1), extracts in expectation at least anΩ(1/ log(rπ))
fraction of the expected revenue of the expected optimal social welfare (and therefore also of the expected revenue of
the optimal dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR auction).
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Proof. The proof use a standard bucketing trick (see, e.g., Babaioff et al. [2007]). Specifically, let M be the sequential
posted price mechanism that draws a value p uniformly at random from the set S = {vminπ 2k : k ∈ [⌈log(rπ) − 1⌉]∪ {0}}.
M offers price p to all the bidders in an arbitrary order, until a bidder accepts.
Let πmax be the probability distribution of the coordinate-wise maximum of π. Note that |S | does not exceed
log(rmaxπ ). Therefore the probability that p is the highest possible value (among the values in S ) that does not exceed
the value drawn from πmax, is equal to 1/ log(rπ). More formally, let πS be the probability distribution from which p is
drawn; then
Prvmax∼πmax ,p∼πS [p ≤ vmax ∩ (∄p′ ∈ S : p′ > p ∧ p′ ≤ vmax)] ≤
1
log(rπ) .
Thus, with probability 1/ log(rπ), the mechanism generates a revenue of exactly vminπ 2k, where k is the number such
that the value drawn from πmax lies in between vminπ 2k and vminπ 2k+1. This implies that with probability 1/ log(rπ) the
mechanism generates a revenue that lies a factor of at most 1/2 away from the optimal social welfare OPT (~v) (i.e., the
coordinate-wise maximum valuation):
E~v∼π[revenue of M(~v)] ≥
1
log(rπ)
1
2
E~v∼π[OPT (~v)] ≥
1
2 log(rπ)E~v∼π[OPT (~v)]. 
This result can be generalized to yield revenue bounds for the case of k-limited supply, where k > 1. We prove a
more general variant of the above in Appendix B.
The above result does not always guarantee a good revenue; for example in the extreme case where vminπ = 0.
However, it is straightforward to generalize the above theorem such that it becomes useful for a much bigger family
of probability distributions: let vˆ and vˇ be two any two values in the support of πmax, and let c(vˆ, vˇ) = Prvmax∼πmax [vˇ ≤
vmax ≤ vˆ]. Then by replacing the values vmaxπ and vminπ in the above proof by respectively vˆ and vˇ, we obtain a sequential
posted price mechanism that extracts in expectation a c(vˆ, vˇ)/(2 log(vˆ/vˇ)) fraction of the optimal social welfare. By
choosing vˆ and vˇ such that this ratio is maximized, we obtain a mechanism that extracts a significant fraction of the
optimal social welfare in any setting where the valuation distribution of a buyer is concentrated in a relatively not too
large interval.
A better result can be given for the unlimited supply case.
Definition 7. For a valuation distribution π on Rn and any i ∈ [n], let vmaxπ,i and vminπ,i be max{vi : ~v ∈ supp(π)} and
min{vi : ~v ∈ supp(π)} respectively. Let rπ,i = vmaxπ,i /vminπ,i , be the ratio between the highest and lowest valuation of buyer i
in the support of π.
Proposition 2. Let n ∈ N≥1, and let π be a probability distribution on Rn. There exists a sequential posted price
mechanism that, when run on instance (n, π, n), extracts in expectation at least anΩ(1/ log(max{rπ,i : i ∈ [n]})) fraction
of the expected revenue of the expected optimal social welfare (and therefore also the expected revenue of the optimal
dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR mechanism).
The proof (found in Appendix F.1) applies similar techniques as is done in the proof of Proposition 1. The
techniques used for proving these results can be applied to improve the approximation guarantees for the more general
k-limited supply setting, for any k ∈ [n], under special conditions. We give an example of such a result in Appendix B.
Clearly, the stated bound of O(1/ log(max{rπ,i : i ∈ [n]})) is very crude. For most practical settings we expect that
it is possible to do a much sharper revenue analysis of the mechanisms in the proofs of the above propositions, by
taking the particular valuation distribution into account. Moreover, as suggested above, also for the unlimited supply
case it is possible to tweak the mechanism in a straightforward way in order to achieve a good revenue in cases where
the ratios rπ,i are very large. Finally, note that the mechanisms in the proofs of these two propositions do not take
into account any dependence and correlation among the valuations of the buyers. When provided with a particular
valuation distribution, a better revenue and sharper analysis may be obtained by taking such dependence into account,
and adapting the mechanisms accordingly.
4 Enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms
The negative results on sequential posted price mechanisms suggest that it is necessary for a mechanism to have a
means to retrieve the valuations of some of the buyers in order to improve the revenue performance. We accordingly
propose a generalization of sequential posted price mechanisms, in such a way that they possess the ability to retrieve
valuations of some buyers.
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Definition 8. An enhanced sequential posted price mechanism for an instance (n, π, k) is a mechanism that can be
implemented by iteratively selecting a buyer i ∈ [n] that has not been selected in a previous iteration, and performing
exactly one of the following actions on buyer i:
• Propose service at price pi to buyer i, which the buyer may accept or reject. If i accepts, he gets the service and
pays pi, resulting in a utility of vi − pi for i. If i rejects, he pays nothing and does not get the service, resulting
in a utility of 0 for i.
• Ask i for his valuation (in which case the buyer pays nothing and does not get service).
Randomization is allowed.
This generalization is still dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR (that is, the revelation principle allows us to convert
them to dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR direct revelation mechanisms). Indeed, for enhanced sequential posted price
mechanisms, when a buyer gets asked his valuation, he has no incentive to lie, because in this case he does not get
service and he pays nothing4.
Next we analyze the revenue performance of enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms. For this class of
mechanisms we prove that, it is unfortunately still the case that no constant fraction of the optimal revenue can be
extracted. Specifically, the next section establishes an O(1/n) bound for enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms.
However, enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms turn out to be more powerful than the standard sequential
posted price. Indeed, contrary to what we had for the former ones, the enhanced mechanisms can be shown to extract
a fraction of the optimal revenue that is independent of the valuation distribution. More precisely, the O(1/n) bound
turns out to be asymptotically tight. Our main positive result for enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms is that
when dependence of the valuation among the buyers is limited, then a constant fraction of the optimal revenue can
be extracted. Specifically, in Section 4.3 we define the concept of d-dimensional dependence and prove that for an
instance (n, π, k) where π is d-dimensionally dependent, there exists an enhanced sequential posted price mechanism
that extracts an Ω(1/d) fraction of the optimal revenue. (This result implies the claimed Ω(1/n) bound by taking
d = (n − 1).)
It is natural to identify the basic reason(s) why, in the case of general correlated distributions, standard and en-
hanced sequential posted price mechanisms fail to achieve a constant approximation of the optimum revenue. There
are two main limitations of (enhanced) sequential posted price mechanisms; namely, 1) such mechanisms do not solicit
bids or values from all buyers, and 2) such mechanisms award items in a sequential manner. Although it is crucial
to retrieve the valuation of all (but one of the) buyers, we now show, in contrast to previously known approximation
results, that it is possible to achieve a constant fraction of the optimum revenue by a mechanism that allocates items
sequentially, and moreover, in an on-line manner. Specifically, we consider the following superclass of the enhanced
sequential posted price mechanisms.
Definition 9. Let (n, π, k) be an instance and let M be a mechanism for that instance. Mechanism M is a blind offer
mechanism iff it can be implemented as follows. Let ~b be the submitted bid vector:
1. Terminate if ~b < supp(π).
2. Either terminate or select a buyer i from the set of buyers that have not yet been selected, such that the choice
of i does not depend on ~b.
3. Propose buyer i to offer service at price pi, where pi is drawn from a probability distribution that depends only
on πi,~b−i (hence the distribution where pi is drawn from is determined by ~b−i and in particular it does not depend
on bi).
4. Go to step 2 if there is supply left, i.e., if the number of buyers who have accepted offers does not exceed k.
Randomization is allowed.
Remark 1. The price offered to a buyer is entirely determined by the valuations of the remaining buyers, and is
independent of what is reported by buyer i himself. Also the iteration in which a buyer is picked cannot be influenced
by his bid. Nonetheless, blind offer mechanisms are in general not incentive compatible due to the fact that a bidder
4A problematic aspect is that while there is no incentive to a buyer to lie, there is also no incentive to tell the truth. This problem is addressed in
Appendix C
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may be incentivized to misreport his bid in order to increase the probability of supply not running out before he is
picked. However, blind offer mechanisms can easily be made incentive compatible as follows: let M be a non-IC blind
offer mechanism, let ~b be a bid vector and let zi(~b) be the probability that M picks bidder i before supply has run out.
When a bidder is picked, we adapt M by skipping that bidder with a probability pi(~b) that is chosen in a way such that
zi(~b)pi(~b) = min{zi(bi~b−i) : bi ∈ supp(πi)}. This is a blind offer mechanism in which buyer i has no incentive to lie,
because now the probability that i is made an offer is independent of his bid. Doing this iteratively for all buyers yields
a dominant strategy IC mechanism M′. Note that the act of skipping a bidder can be implemented by offering a price
that is so high that a bidder will never accept it, thus M′ is still a blind offer mechanism. Moreover, if the probability
that any bidder in M is made an offer is lower bounded by a constant c, then in M′ the probability that any bidder is
offered a price is at least c. We apply this principle in the proof of Theorem 4 below in order to obtain a dominant
strategy IC mechanism with a constant factor revenue performance5.
It is well known under the name of the taxation principle that a mechanism is dominant strategy IC if and only
if it can be implemented by an algorithm that works as follows: (i) the buyers are simultaneously presented with a
payment that does not depend on their own bid; (ii) the items are allocated to the buyers for which the profit, i.e.,
the difference between the bid and the price, is maximized. This algorithm closely resembles the description of blind
offer mechanisms. However, we would like to emphasize that there are some significant differences. First, using the
taxation principle, prices are set in advance of offering service, whereas in blind offer mechanisms prices are presented
sequentially, thus the price offered to the i-th buyer can depend on the decisions taken by the previous buyers. Second,
using the taxation principle the winners are chosen at the end, whereas in blind offer mechanisms the winners are
decided on-line, so that it is possible that items are allocated to buyers without maximizing the profit. Hence, there are
dominant strategy mechanisms cannot be implemented as blind offer mechanisms.
A blind offer mechanisms preserves the same conceptually simple structure as standard and enhanced posted
price mechanisms, but it bases its proposal to a buyer i on the set of all valuations other than that of i, whereas an
ESPP mechanism bases its proposal to a buyer i only on the valuations that have been revealed by buyers in previous
iterations. This increases the power of blind offer mechanisms: for example, it is not hard to see that the classical
Myerson mechanism for the independent single-item setting belongs to the class of blind offer mechanisms. Thus
blind offer mechanisms are optimal when buyers’ valuations are independent. We will prove next that, even when
buyer valuations are correlated, blind offer mechanisms can always extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue,
even for the ex-post IC, ex-post IR solution concept. For correlated valuation distributions, other mechanisms that
achieve a constant approximation to the optimal revenue have been defined by Ronen [2001], and then by Chawla et al.
[2014] and Dobzinski et al. [2011]. However, these mechanisms, as in the taxation principle setting, allocate the items
to profit-maximizing buyers. Thus, they are different from blind offer mechanisms in which the allocation is on-line.
4.1 Limitations of enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms
Here we show that enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms cannot extract a constant fraction of the expected
revenue of the optimal dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanisms. This is done by constructing a family of instances
on which no enhanced sequential posted price mechanism can perform well.
Theorem 3. For all n ∈ N≥2, there exists an valuation distribution π such that for all k ∈ [n] there does not exist
a enhanced sequential posted price mechanism for instance (n, π, k) that extracts more than a O(1/n) fraction of the
expected revenue of the optimal dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
Proof. We prove this for the case of k = n. The proof is easy to adapt for different k.
Let n ∈ N and m = 2n. We prove this claim by specifying an instance In with n buyers, and proving that
limn→0 RM(In)/OR(In) = 0, where RM(In) denotes the largest expected revenue achievable by any enhanced sequential
posted price mechanism on In, and OR(In) denotes the largest expected revenue achievable by a dominant strategy IC,
ex-post IR mechanism.
In is defined as follows. Let ǫ ∈ R>0 be a number smaller than 1/nm2. The valuation distribution π is the one
induced by the following process: (i) Draw a buyer i⋆ from the set [n] uniformly at random; (ii) Draw numbers
5More precisely, for the particular (non-truthful) blind offer mechanism that we propose and analyze in section 4.2, it will turn out that applying
the transformation described here does not result in any additional loss in revenue.
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{c j : j ∈ [n] \ {i⋆}} independently from [m] uniformly at random; (iii) For all j ∈ [n] \ {i⋆}, set v j = c jǫ; (iv) Set
vi⋆ =
1(∑
j∈[n]\{i⋆} c j
)
mod m
+ 1
. (2)
Observe that for this distribution it holds that for all i ∈ [n], the valuation vi is uniquely determined by the valuations
(v j) j∈[n]\{i}. The optimal (direct revelation) mechanism can therefore extract the total optimal social welfare as its
revenue, as follows: it provides service to every buyer, and sets the payment as follows. Let bi be the bid, i.e., the
reported valuation, of buyer i. Then,
• if b j < 1/m for all j ∈ [n] \ {i}, charge i a price of 1/
((∑
j∈[n]\{i} b j/ǫ
)
mod m
+ 1
)
;
• otherwise, if there is a buyer j ∈ [n]\{i} and a number ci ∈ [m] such that b j = 1/
((
ci +
∑
ℓ∈[n]\{i, j} bℓ/ǫ
)
mod m
+ 1
)
,
then charge i the price ciǫ;
• otherwise, the mechanism charges i an arbitrary price.
This mechanism is dominant strategy IC because the mechanism’s decision to provide service to a buyer does not
depend on his bid, and the price that a buyer is charged is not dependent on his own bid. This mechanism is ex-post
IR because bidding truthfully always gives the buyer a utility of 0. This mechanism achieves a revenue equal to the
optimal social welfare because (by definition of the pricing rule) the price that a buyer is charged is equal to the
valuation of that buyer, if all buyers bid truthfully. Also, note that the third bullet in the above specification of the
mechanism will not occur when the buyers bid truthfully, and is only included for the sake of completely specifying
the mechanism.
We argue that OR(In) = E~v∼π
[∑
i∈[n] vi
]
=
∑
i∈[n] E~v∼π[vi] = (n − 1)mǫ/2 + Hm/m, where the last equality follows
because the expected valuation of each of the buyers is ((n− 1)/n)(mǫ/2)+ (1/n)(Hm/m). This in turn holds because a
buyer is elected as buyer i⋆ with probability 1/n, and buyer i⋆’s marginal distribution is the distribution π′ induced by
drawing a value from the set {1/a : a ∈ [m]} uniformly at random. The latter distribution has already been encountered
in the beginning of Section 3.1, where we concluded that its expected value is Hm/m.
We now proceed to prove an upper bound on RM(In). Let M be an arbitrary enhanced posted price mechanism.
Because M is randomized, running M on In can be viewed as a probability distribution on a sample space of determin-
istic enhanced posted price mechanisms that are run on In. We analyze the revenue of the mechanism conditioned on
three disjoint events that form a partition of this sample space. Consider first the event E1 that buyer i⋆ gets asked for
his valuation (when running M on In). Conditioned on this event, the mechanism does not attain a revenue of more
than (n − 1)mǫ because the revenue of each buyer in [n] \ {i⋆} is at most mǫ.
Consider next the event E2 where buyer i⋆ does not get asked for his valuation and buyer i⋆ is not the last buyer that
is selected. Then a price pi⋆ is proposed to i⋆. Without loss of generality, M draws pi⋆ from a probability distribution
Pi⋆ with finite support, and the choice of distribution Pi⋆ depends on the sequence S of buyers queried prior to i⋆
together with the responses of the buyers in S . These responses take the form of a reported valuation in case a buyer in
S is asked to report his valuation, and the form of an accept/reject decision otherwise. Because i⋆ is not the last buyer
selected, [n] \ (S ∪ {i⋆}) is non-empty, and there exists a buyer j ∈ [n] \ (S ∪ {i⋆}) such that the choice of Pi⋆ does not
depend on c j. By the fact that c j is drawn independently and uniformly at random from [m] for all j ∈ [n] \ (S ∪ {i⋆})
and by (2), the marginal probability distribution of the valuation of buyer i⋆ conditioned on E2, is π′ (which we defined
above). Therefore
Epi⋆∼Pi⋆ ,~v∼π[pi⋆Pr[vi⋆ ≤ pi⋆]] = Epi⋆∼Pi⋆ ,~v∼π′ [pi⋆Pr[vi⋆ ≤ pi⋆]] =
1
m
,
where the last equality follows from (1). Thus, the expected revenue of M conditioned on E2 is at most 1/m+(n−1)mǫ.
In the event E3, the mechanism selects i⋆ last. The expected revenue of M conditioned on this event is at most the
expected maximum social welfare: (n − 1)mǫ/2+ Hm/m. The probability of event E3 occurring is 1/n, because of the
following. For ℓ ∈ [n], let Eℓ3 be the event that i⋆ is not the ℓ-th buyer selected by M, and let E<ℓ3 be the event that i⋆ is
not among the first ℓ − 1 buyers selected by M. Note that this means that Pr[E<13 ] = 1. Then,
Pr[E3] = Pr[E<n3 ] = Pr[En−13 | E<n−13 ]Pr[E<n−13 ] =
∏
ℓ∈[n−1]
Pr[Eℓ3 | E<ℓ3 ].
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For every ℓ ∈ [n−1], and every set S of ℓ−1 buyers, it holds that if i⋆ < S and M selects S as the first ℓ−1 buyers, the
probability of selecting buyer i⋆ as the ℓ-th buyer is 1/(n − (ℓ − 1)), by the definition of π (particularly because buyer
i⋆ is a buyer picked uniformly at random). Therefore,
Pr[E3] = Pr[E<n3 ] =
∏
ℓ∈[n−1]
(
1 − 1
n − (ℓ − 1)
)
=
∏
ℓ∈[n−1]
n − ℓ
n − ℓ + 1 =
1
n
.
Thus, we obtain the following upper bound on RM(In):
RM(In) ≤ Pr[E1](n − 1)mǫ + Pr[E2]
(
1
m
+ (n − 1)mǫ
)
+
1
n
( (n − 1)mǫ
2
+
Hm
m
)
≤ 1
m
+ 2(n − 1)mǫ + mǫ
2
+
Hm
mn
≤ 3(n − 1)mǫ + Hm
mn
+
1
m
.
This leads us to conclude that
RM(In)
OR(In) ≤
3nmǫ + Hm/mn + 1/m
Hm/m
=
3nm2ǫ + Hm/n + 1
Hm
≤ Hm/n + 4
Hm
=
1
n
+
4
H2n
∈ O
(
1
n
)
. 
4.2 Revenue guarantees for blind offer mechanisms
We prove in this section that blind offer mechanisms can always extract a constant fraction of the optimal revenue,
without making any assumptions on the valuation distribution. Specifically we prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4. For every instance (n, π, k), there is a dominant strategy IC blind offer mechanism for which the expected
revenue is at least a (2− √e)/4 ≈ 0.088 fraction of the maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by an ex-post
IC, ex-post IR mechanism. Moreover, if k = n, then there is a blind offer mechanism for which the expected revenue
equals the full maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by an ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
We need to establish some intermediate results in order to build up to a proof for the above theorem. First, we
derive an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism. For a given instance (n, π, k),
consider the linear program with variables (yi(~v))i∈[n],~v∈supp(π) where the objective is
max
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v
′
i ≥ vi]viyi(vi,~v−i) (3)
subject to the constraints
∀i ∈ [n],~v−i ∈ supp(π−i) :
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
yi(~v) ≤ 1, (4)
∀~v ∈ supp(π) :
∑
i∈[n]
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i≤vi
yi(v′i ,~v−i) ≤ k, (5)
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : yi(~v) ≥ 0. (6)
The next lemma states that the solution to this linear program forms an upper bound on the revenue of the optimal
mechanism, and that the solution to the above linear program is integral in case k = n.
Lemma 1. For any instance (n, π, k), the linear program (3-6) upper bounds the maximum expected revenue achievable
by an ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism. Moreover, when k = n the optimal solution to (3–6) is to set yi(vi,~v−i) to 1 for
the value vi that maximizes viPrv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i ≥ vi] (for all i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π)).
Proof sketch. Integrality for k = n is the easiest to prove among these two claims, so we do that first. Note that in
case k = n, we can safely remove the constraints (5) from the linear program, because when k = n these constraints
are implied by (4) and (6). The linear program that remains tells us how to optimize a sum of convex combinations of
values. That is, it effectively tells us to pick for each i ∈ [n] and ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i) a convex combination of the values
{viPrv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i ≥ vi]}v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ). The optimal solution is therefore to put weight 1 on the maximum values in these sets,
i.e., to set yi(vi,~v−i) to 1 for the value vi that maximizes viPrv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i ≥ vi].
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To prove the first of the two claims in the lemma, we first prove that a monotonicity constraint holds on the set of
possible allocations that a ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism can output. Moreover, we show that the prices charged
by the mechanism cannot exceed a certain upper bound given in terms of allocation probabilities. Then, we formulate
a linear program whose optimal value equals the revenue of the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism. We finally
rewrite the latter linear program into (3–6). This proof relies on the approach introduced in [Gupta and Nagarajan,
2013, Section 4.2]. 
We can now proceed to prove our main result about blind offer mechanisms. We first handle the case of unlimited
supply. Consider the following blind offer mechanism.
Definition 10. Consider an instance (n, π, n). For i ∈ [n] and ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i), fix pˆi,~v−i to be any value in the set
argp max{pPrvi∼πi,~v−i [p ≤ vi] : p ∈ R}. Define Mnπ to be the following blind offer mechanism for allocating service to n
buyers when the valuations of these buyers are drawn from π.
Let ~b be the submitted vector of bids. For i ∈ [n], if ~b−i ∈ supp(π−i) and bi ≥ pˆi,~b−i , then Mnπ gives service to i
and charges i the price pˆi,~b−i . If bi < pˆi,~b−i , then the price charged to i is 0, and i is not given service. Otherwise, if
~b−i < supp(π−i), the price charged to i is 0 and i is not allocated service.
Lemma 2. For instance (n, π, n), mechanism Mnπ extracts the maximum revenue among the class of ex-post IC, ex-post
IR mechanisms.
Proof. Denote by pi(~v) the price charged to buyer i ∈ [n] when the buyers have valuation vector ~v ∈ supp(π). We can
write the expected revenue of Mnπ as follows:
E~v∼π

∑
i∈[n]
pi(~v)
 =
∑
i∈[n]
E~v∼π[pi(~v)] =
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)pi(~v)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)Prvi∼πi,~v−i [vi ≥ pˆi,~v−i] pˆi,~v−i .
Lastly, by Lemma 1 and the objective function (3) of the linear program, we conclude that the latter expression is equal
to the solution of the linear program, which is an upper bound on the optimal revenue among all ex-post IC, ex-post
IR mechanisms by Theorem 1. 
For the case of k-limited supply where k < n, things are somewhat more complicated. Indeed, there does not
seem to exist a blind offer mechanism as simple and elegant as Mnπ. However, we are still able to define a blind offer
mechanism that extracts a constant fraction of the optimal revenue.
Definition 11. Let (n, π, k) be an arbitrary instance. Let (y∗i (~v))i∈[n] be the optimal solution to the linear program (3–6)
corresponding to this instance.
Let Mkπ be the blind offer mechanism that does the following: let ~v be the vector of submitted valuations. Iterate
over the set of buyers such that in iteration i, buyer i is picked. In iteration i, select one of the following options: offer
service to buyer i at a price p for which it holds that y∗i (p, ~b−i) > 0, or skip buyer i. The probabilities with which
these options are chosen are as follows: price p is offered with probability y∗i (p, ~b−i)/2, and buyer i is skipped with
probability 1 − ∑p′∈supp(πi,~b−i ) y∗i (p, ~b−i)/2. The mechanism terminates once k buyers have accepted an offer, or when
iteration n + 1 is reached.
Lemma 3. On instance (n, π, k), the expected revenue of blind offer mechanism Mkπ is at least a (2 −
√
e)/4 ≈ 0.088
fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism. Moreover, there exists a dominant
strategy IC blind offer mechanism of which the expected revenue is at least a (2 − √e)/4 ≈ 0.088 fraction of the
expected revenue of the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
Proof sketch. We will show that the expected revenue of Mkπ is at least
2 − √e
4
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v
′
i ≥ vi]viy∗i (vi,~v−i),
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which, by Lemma 1 and the LP objective function (3), is a (2 − √e)/4 fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal
ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
For a vector of valuations~v ∈ supp(π) and a buyer i ∈ [n], denote by Di,~v−i the probability distribution from which
mechanism Mkπ(~v) draws a price that is offered to buyer i, in case iteration i ∈ [n] is reached (as described in Definition
11). We let V be a number that exceeds max{vi : i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π)} and represent by V the option where Mkπ(~v)
chooses to skip buyer i, so that Di,~v−i is a probability distribution on the set {V} ∪ {vi : y∗i (vi,~v−i) > 0}. Then,
E~v∼π[revenue of Mkπ(~v)] ≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i )
: pi≤vi
piy∗i (pi,~v−i)
2
Pr∀i:pi∼Di,~v−i [|{ j ∈ [n − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]. (7)
Then, by applying a Chernoff bound, we can prove that
Pr∀i:pi∼Di,~v−i [|{ j ∈ [n − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k] ≥ 1 −
(
e
4
)k/2
≥ 1 −
(
e
4
)1/2
=
2 − √e
2
. (8)
The first of the two claims of Theorem 3 follows by combining (7) and (8). For the second claim, note that (8) gives
a lower bound of (2 − √e)/2 on the probability that all players get selected by the mechanism. Therefore, we can
combine (8) with the principle explained in Remark 1 that allows us to transform Mkπ into a dominant strategy IC blind
offer mechanism. The second claim follows by observing that (7) still holds for the transformed mechanism. 
Theorem 4 now follows by combining Lemmas 2 and 3. We note that the approximation factor of the theorem is
certainly not tight and can be improved with additional work. For example, it is possible to show that for k = 1 the
revenue of Mkπ is in fact at least 1/4 of the optimal revenue. Moreover, recall that mechanism Mkπ works by scaling the
probabilities yi(~v) down by 1/2. By making this scaling factor dependent on k and choosing it appropriately, we can
improve the approximation factor further. We emphasize that the focus and purpose of the above result is merely to
show that a constant factor of the optimal revenue (independent of the supply k) is achievable.
4.3 Revenue guarantees for enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms
Finally, in this section we evaluate the revenue guarantees of the enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms in the
presence of a form of limited dependence that we will call d-dimensional dependence, for d ∈ N. These are probability
distributions for which it holds that the valuation distribution of a buyer conditioned on the valuations of the rest of
the buyers can be retrieved by only looking at the valuations of a certain subset of d buyers. Formally, we have the
following definition.
Definition 12. A probability distribution π on Rn is d-dimensionally dependent iff for all i ∈ [n] there is a subset
S i ⊆ [n] \ {i}, |S i| = d, such that for all ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i) it holds that πi,~vS i = πi,~v−i .
Note that if d = 0, then π is a product of n independent probability distributions on R. On the other hand, the
set of (n − 1)-dimensionally dependent probability distributions on Rn equals the set of all probability distributions
on Rn. This notion is useful in practice for settings where it is expected that a buyer’s valuation distribution has a
reasonably close relationship with the valuation of a few other buyers. As an example of one of these practical settings
consider the case that there is a true valuation v for the item, an expert buyer that keeps this valuation, and remaining
buyers whose valuation is influenced by independent noise. It is then sufficient to know the valuation of a single buyer,
namely the expert one, in order to retrieve the exact conditional distribution of any other buyer. We would like to stress
that in order to make this distribution 1-dimensional dependent, it is sufficient that such an expert buyer exists, even
if auctioneer does not know which buyer is the expert. Moreover, our definition of dimensional dependence is quite
inclusive; for example, in the example above, even if each bidder picks another bidder as her own expert and adds
noise to the valuation of her expert, the distribution would remain 1-dimensionally dependent.
In general, d-dimensional dependence is relevant to many practical settings in which it is not necessary to have
complete information about the valuations of all the other buyers in order to say something useful about the valuation
of a particular buyer. This rules out the extreme kind of dependence defined in the proof of Theorem 3; there the
distributions are not (n−2)-dimensionally dependent, because for each buyer i it holds that the valuations of all buyers
[n] \ {i} are necessary in order to extract the valuation distribution of i conditioned on the others’ valuations.
It is important to realize that the class of d-dimensional dependent distributions is a strict superset of the class of
Markov random fields of degree d. A Markov random field of degree d is a popular model to capture the notion of
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limited dependence, and for that model a more straightforward procedure than the one in the proof below exists for
obtaining the same revenue guarantee (see Appendix E). However, the notion of d-dimensional dependence is both
more natural (for our setting) and much more general. In fact, we show in Appendix D that there exist distributions on
Rn that are 1-dimensionally dependent, but are not a Markov random field of degree less than n/2.
In a sense, our definition of d-dimensional dependence resembles the limited dependence condition under which
the Lovasz Local Lemma holds.
The main result that we will prove in this section is the following.
Theorem 5. For every instance (n, π, k) where π is d dimensionally dependent, there exists an enhanced sequential
posted price mechanism of which the expected revenue is at least a (2 − √e)/(16d) ≥ 1/(46d) ∈ Ω(1/d) fraction of
the maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by an ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism. Moreover, if k = n, then
there exists an enhanced posted price mechanism of which the expected revenue is at least a 1/(4d) fraction of the
maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by an ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
A corollary of this theorem is that the bound of Theorem 3 is asymptotically tight.
Corollary 1. For every instance (n, π, k) there exists an enhanced sequential posted price mechanism of which the
expected revenue is at least a Ω(1/n) fraction of the maximum expected revenue that can be extracted by an ex-post
IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
For proving our main result on enhanced sequential posted price mechanisms, we make use of our insights about
blind offer mechanisms. The next lemma shows how we can convert blind offer mechanisms into enhanced sequen-
tial posted price mechanisms while losing only a factor of 1/4d of the revenue, if the valuation distribution is d-
dimensionally dependent.
Lemma 4. Let α ∈ [0, 1] and let (n, π, k) be an instance where π is d-dimensionally dependent. If there exists a blind
offer mechanism that extracts in expectation at least an α fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal dominant
strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism, then there exists an enhanced sequential posted price mechanism that extracts in
expectation at least a α/max{4d, 1} fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
Proof. Let M be a blind offer mechanism that extracts in expectation at least an α fraction of the expected revenue of
the optimal dominant-strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism. Let pMi (~v) be the expected price paid to mechanism M by
buyer i ∈ [n] when ~v are the reported valuations. Let q ∈ [0, 1] and consider the following enhanced sequential posted
price mechanism Mq: the mechanism Mq first partitions [n] into two sets A and B = [n] \ A. It does so by placing each
buyer independently with probability q in set A, and placing him in set B otherwise. Then, the mechanism retrieves
the vector ~vA by asking the buyers in A for their valuations. The existence of M implies the existence of a blind offer
mechanism MB that only makes offers to buyers in B such that the expected price pMBi (~v) paid to MB by a buyer in B is
at least pMi (~v) (this can be achieved by doing the same as M, but refraining from offering to buyers in A). Mechanism
Mq offers each buyer i ∈ B a price that is determined by simulating MB as follows: make the same decisions as MB
would, except for that an offer of MB is skipped if πi,~v−i , πi,~vA .
Let P be the distribution (induced by mechanism Mq) on the set of partitions of [n] into 2 sets. For i ∈ [n], let
S i ⊆ [n] \ {i} be the set of d buyers such that πi,~vS i = πi,~v−i for all ~v ∈ Rn. For T ⊆ [n], let pi(T,~v) be the expected price
paid to Mq by a buyer i ∈ T , conditioned on the event that B = T and S i ⊆ A. Note that pi(T,~v) ≥ pMBi (~v) ≥ pMi (~v).
Therefore, the expected revenue of Mq is
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
i∈[n]
Pr{A,B}∼P[i ∈ B ∩ S i ⊆ A]pi(B,~v) =
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
i∈[n]
(1 − q)qd pi(B,~v)
≥ (1 − q)qd
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
i∈[n]
pMi (~v)
The last (double) summation is at least α times the expected revenue of the optimal dominant strategy IC, ex post IR
mechanism, by definition of M. Therefore, this mechanism extracts at least a (1−q)qdα fraction of the optimal revenue.
For d = 0 it is optimal to set q = 0, which results in an enhanced sequential posted price mechanism whose revenue
is α-approximately optimal. For d = 1 it is optimal to set q = 1/2, which results in a (α/4)-approximately optimal
enhanced sequential posted price mechanism. For d ≥ 2 setting q = 1 − 1/d will achieve the desired approximation
ratio, since limd→∞(1 − 1/d)d = 1/e. Moreover, (1 − 1/d)d is increasing in d, and equals 1/4 for d = 2. 
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We note that in the above proof it is easy to see that we can decrease the fraction q of buyers being probed for their
valuation at the cost of worsening the approximation guarantee.
Theorem 5 directly follows by combining the lemmas above.
5 Open problems
Besides improving any of the approximation bounds that we established in the present paper, there are many other
interesting further research directions. For example, it would be interesting to investigate the revenue guarantees
under the additional constraint that the sequential posted price mechanism be order-oblivious: i.e., the mechanism has
no control over which buyers to pick, and should perform well for any possible ordering of the buyers. We are also
interested in resolving some questions regarding the use of randomization in our enhanced posted price mechanism
that extracts O(1/d) of the optimal revenue: in the current proof it is necessary to pick buyers uniformly at random.
Does there exist a deterministic enhanced sequential posted price mechanism that attains the same revenue guarantee,
or is randomness a necessity?
An obvious and interesting research direction is to investigate more general auction problems. In particular, to
what extent can extended SPP mechanisms be applied to auctions having non-identical items? Additionally, can such
mechanisms be applied to more complex allocation constraints or specific valuation functions for the buyers? The
agents may have, for example, a demand of more than one item, or there may be a matroid feasibility constraint on the
set of buyers or on the set of items that may be allocated.
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APPENDIX
A Continuous distribution properties
Let π be a valuation distribution on [0, ai]n, with ai ∈ R≥0 for i ∈ [n], with density f that is continuous and nowhere
zero. Distribution π is said to satisfy affiliation iff for every two valuation vectors ~v, ~w ∈ supp(π) it holds that f (~v ∧
~w) f (~v∨ ~w) ≥ f (~v) f (~w), where ~v∧ ~w is the component-wise minimum and ~v ∨ ~w is the component-wise maximum. For
i ∈ [n] and ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i) the conditional marginal density function fi(·|~v−i) is defined as
fi(vi | ~v−i) = f (vi,~v−i)∫ a
0 f (t,~v−i)dt
,
the conditional revenue curve Bi(· | ~v−i) is defined as
Bi(vi | ~v−i) = vi
∫ a
vi
fi(t | ~v−i)dt,
and the conditional virtual value φi(· | ~v−i) is defined as
φi(vi | ~v−i) = −
d
dvi Bi(vi | ~v−i)
fi(vi | ~v−i) .
Denote by Fi(· | ~v−i) the cumulative distribution function corresponding to fi(· | ~v−i). Distribution π satisfies regularity
if φi(· | ~v−i) is non-decreasing for all i ∈ [n] and ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i) and it satisfies the monotone hazard rate condition if
1−Fi(vi |~v−i)
fi(vi |~v−i) is non-increasing in vi for all i ∈ [n] and ~v−i ∈ supp(π−i).
A discussion and justification for the above notions is outside of the scope of this paper, and we refer the interested
reader to [Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen, 2013].
Note that Roughgarden and Talgam-Cohen [2013] proved that for any distribution π that satisfies regularity and
affiliation the Myerson mechanism is ex-post IC, ex-post IR and optimal among all ex-post IC and ex-post IR mecha-
nisms.
B A sequential posted price mechanism for the k-limited setting
Definition 13. For a valuation distribution π on Rn, let vmax(k)π and vmin(k)π be respectively the maximum kth largest and
minimum kth smallest valuation among the valuation vectors in supp(π). Let r(k)π = vmax(k)π /vmin(k)π be the ratio between
these values.
Theorem 6. Let n ∈ N≥1, and let π be a probability distribution onRn. For any k ∈ [n], there exists a sequential posted
price mechanism that, when run on instance (n, π, k), extracts in expectation at least an Ω
(
1
log(r(k)π )
· v
max(k)
π
v
max(1)
π
)
fraction of
the expected revenue of the expected optimal social welfare (and therefore also of the expected revenue of the optimal
dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism).
Proof. Let M be the sequential posted price mechanism that draws a value p uniformly at random from the set S =
{vmin(k)π 2 j : j ∈ [⌈log(r(k)π ) − 1⌉] ∪ {0}}. M offers price p to all the buyers in an arbitrary order, until k buyers accept.
Let πmax(k) be the probability distribution of the k-th highest value of π. Note that |S | does not exceed log(r(k)π ).
Therefore the probability that p is the highest possible value (among the values in S ) that does not exceed the value
drawn from πmax(k), is equal to 1/ log(r(k)π ). More formally, let πS be the probability distribution from which p is drawn;
then
Prvmax(k)∼πmax(k),p∼πS [p ≤ vmax(k) ∩ (∄p′ ∈ S : p′ > p ∧ p′ ≤ vmax(k))] ≤
1
log(r(k)π )
.
Thus, with probability 1/ log(r(k)π ), the mechanism extracts from each winner a revenue of exactly vmin(k)π 2 j, where j
is the number such that the value drawn from πmax(k) lies in between vmin(k)π 2 j and vmin(k)π 2 j+1. This implies that with
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probability 1/ log(r(k)π ) the mechanism extracts from buyer i a revenue that lies a factor of O
(
v
max(k)
π
v
max(1)
π
)
away from vmax(1)π .
This leads to the conclusion that
E~v∼π[revenue of M(~v)] ≥ Ω
 1
log(r(k)π )
· v
max(k)
π
v
max(1)
π
 ∑
i∈WM
vmax(1)π ,
where WM denotes the set of buyers for which the mechanism M allocates the service. The theorem then follows
since
∑
i∈WM v
max(1)
π =
∑
i∈WOPT v
max(1)
π ≥ OPT =
∑
i∈WOPT vi, where WOPT denotes the set of buyers at which the optimal
mechanism allocates the service, and OPT is the social welfare achieved by the optimal mechanism. 
We say that an instance (n, π, k) is k-well-separated if for any ~v ∈ supp(π) the k-th coordinate-wise maximum
vmax(k)π is achieved only by a single buyer, i.e., the set {i : vi = vmax(k)π ,~v ∈ supp(π)} is a singleton. Then we can prove
the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Let n ∈ N≥1, and let π be a discrete probability distribution on Rn. For any k ∈ [n], if the instance
(n, π, k) is k-well-separated, then there exists a sequential posted price mechanism that, when run on instance (n, π, k),
extracts in expectation at least an Ω
(
1
log(r(k)π )
· maxi∈[n] log v
max(k)
π
vmax
π,i
)
fraction of the expected optimal social welfare (and
therefore also of the expected revenue of the optimal dominant strategy IC and ex-post IR mechanism).
Proof. Since π is discrete, let δ be the smallest ratio larger than 1 between two valuation in ~v ∈ supp(π), i.e., δ =
mini, j{vi/v j > 1: ~v ∈ supp(π)}. Consider ǫ ≤ δ and let M be the sequential posted price mechanism that draws a value
p uniformly at random from the set S = {vmin(k)π ǫ j : j ∈ [⌈logǫ (r(k)π ) − 1⌉] ∪ {0}}. Moreover, M draws for each i ∈ [n]
a value pi uniformly at random from the set S i = {vminπ,i ǫℓ : ℓ ∈ [⌊logǫ pvminπ,i ⌋, ⌈logǫ
p
vminπ,i
− 1⌉]}. M proposes prices to the
buyers in an arbitrary order, and offers price pi to buyer i.
Let πmax(k) be the probability distribution of the k-th coordinate-wise maximum of π. Note that |S | does not exceed
logǫ(r(k)π ). Therefore the probability that p is the highest possible value (among the values in S ) that does not exceed
the value drawn from πmax(k), is equal to 1/ logǫ (r(k)π ). More formally, let πS be the probability distribution from which
p is drawn; then
Prvmax(k)∼πmax(k),p∼πS [p ≤ vmax(k) ∩ (∄p′ ∈ S : p′ > p ∧ p′ ≤ vmax(k))] ≤
1
logǫ (r(k)π )
.
Thus, with probability 1/ logǫ(r(k)π ), the mechanism selects p = vmin(k)π ǫ j, where j is the number such that the value
drawn from πmax(k) lies in between vmin(k)π ǫ j and vmin(k)π ǫ j+1. When this event occurs, since the instance is k-well
separated and by our choice of ǫ, the set WM of buyers whose valuation is at least p has size exactly k and corresponds
of the set WOPT of buyers with the k highest valuation in ~v ∈ supp(π). Hence, with probability 1/ logǫ(r(k)π ) the
mechanism M extracts revenue only from buyers in WOPT .
Now, for any i ∈ WOPT , let πi be the probability distribution of the i-th coordinate of π. Note that |S i| does not
exceed logǫ
vmax
π,i
v
max(k)
π
. Therefore the probability that pi is the highest possible value (among the values in S i) that does not
exceed the value drawn from πi, is at least logǫ
v
max(k)
π
vmaxπ,i
. More formally, let πS i be the uniform distribution on S ; then
Prvi∼πi ,pi∼πS i [pi ≤ vi ∩ (∄p′i ∈ S i : p′i > pi ∧ p′i ≤ vi)] ≤ logǫ
vmax(k)π
vmax
π,i
.
Thus, with probability 1
logǫ (r(k)π )
· logǫ v
max(k)
π
vmax
π,i
, the mechanism extracts from buyer i ∈ WOPT a revenue of exactly vi,min2ℓ,
where ℓ is the number such that the value drawn from πi lies in between vi,min2ℓ and vi,min2ℓ+1. This implies that with
probability 1
logǫ (r(k)π )
· logǫ v
max(k)
π
vmax
π,i
the mechanism extracts from buyer i ∈ WOPT a revenue that lies a factor of at most 1/2
away from vi. This leads to the conclusion that
E~v∼π[revenue of M(~v)] ≥
∑
i∈WOPT
1
logǫ (r(k)π )
· logǫ
v
max(k)
π
vmaxπ,i
1
2
Evi∼πi [vi]
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= Ω
 1
log(r(k)π )
· max
i∈[n]
log v
max(k)
π
vmaxπ,i
∑
i∈[n]
Evi∼πi [vi]
= Ω
 1
log(r(k)π )
· max
i∈[n]
log
vmax(k)π
vmaxπ,i
E~v∼π[OPT (~v)],
where OPT (~v) = ∑i∈WOPT vi denotes the optimal social welfare when the buyers have valuation vector v. 
C Addressing some practical problems of enhanced sequential posted price
mechanisms
The first problematic aspect is that while there is no incentive for a buyer to lie, there is also no incentive to tell the
truth. Therefore, incentive compatibility is only achieved in weakly dominant strategies. We note that in the literature
many (or perhaps most) truthful mechanisms are only incentive compatible in the weak sense. Such mechanisms are
of theoretical interest, and may possibly be turned into more practically satisfactory mechanisms.
In the case of enhanced SPP mechanisms, the lack of a strong incentive to be truthful only applies to those buyers
who are asked for their values, knowing they will not be allocated the item. Such a buyer may not cooperate at all,
or in stating their value may not be truthful. The first problem can be resolved by compensating the buyer with some
fixed small amount of money that the auctioneer obtains from the buyers who pay for the service. Having insured
some level of cooperation, how do we incentivize these buyers to be truthful?
Here is an example of such an adaptation of our enhanced SPP mechanisms that creates the proper strong incentive.
Suppose now that we have provided an incentive for every buyer to reveal a valuation. At the start of the auction, using
a cryptographic protocol (or just a normal sealed envelope), we ask each of the buyers for a sealed commitment of their
value. Furthermore, for buyers being offered a price, with some (say small) probability, the buyer must reveal their
private valuation in order to be allowed the item. If the revealed value is larger than the offered price, then the buyer is
punished and the item is not allocated to him. Now this is strongly incentive compatible if we assume buyers are risk
averse so that they will not over-bid their valuation. There is clearly no monetary reason for a buyer to under-bid.
D On d-dimensional dependence versus Markov random fields of degree d
This section is intended for readers who are interested in the relative generality of d-dimensionally dependence com-
pared to Markov random fields of degree d. We assume that reader is familiar with the definition of Markov random
fields. For convenience we will state a weaker notion here.
Definition 14. Given a undirected graph G = ([n], E), a probability distribution π on Rn is a local Markov random
field with respect to G if the following property, named local Markov property, holds: for all i ∈ [n], πi is independent
of π[n]\({i}∪Γ(i)) when conditioning on all coordinates in Γ(i). Here, Γ(i) denotes the neighborhood of i in G.
(In a true Markov random field, two additional technical conditions needs to be satisfied, called the pairwise
Markov property and the global Markov property.) We will give an example of a 1-dimensionally dependent distribu-
tion that is not a local Markov random field with respect to any graph G in which all vertices have a degree less than
(n − 2)/2.
Consider a distribution π on {0, 1}n+2. A vector v drawn from π is formed according to the following random
process: we are given 2n distinct probability distributions on {0, 1}. We name these distributions πi,0 and πi,1, for
i ∈ [n]. These distributions are such that both 0 and 1 occur with positive probability. Let v′ be a value drawn from yet
another distribution π′ on {0, 1} where again both 0 and 1 have positive probability. The final generated vector is then
(v1,v′ , v2,v′ , . . . , vn,v′ , v′, v′), where vi,v′ is drawn from πi,v′ .
π is clearly 1-dimensionally dependent, since for i ∈ [n] the conditional marginal distribution πi,~v−i is determined
by only the value v′, which is the value of the (n + 1)-th coordinate. Also, the value of the (n + 1)-th coordinate is
entirely determined by the (n + 2)-th coordinate, and vice versa.
We can also easily see that π is not a Markov random field with respect to any graph in which all vertices have
a degree less than n/2. Let G be a graph such that π is a Markov random field. Suppose for contradiction that there
exists an i ∈ [n] for which it holds that Γ(i) ⊆ [n]. Then the local Markov property would be violated. Therefore, each
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vertex in [n] is connected to either vertex n + 1 or n + 2. Hence, we conclude that either vertex n + 1 or n + 2 has at
least n/2 vertices attached to it.
E A blind-offer mechanism that achieves O(1/d)-approximated revenue for
Markov random fields of degree d
Consider the following marking procedure: given Markov random fields of degree d (in which nodes represent buyers),
at each round, mark a uniformly random node, then remove the node and all its neighbors and repeat until no node is
left. Note that, each node is marked with probability at least 1/(d + 1). Consider now the following blind offer mech-
anism: do value queries to the unmarked buyers, and run posted pricing on the marked buyers. The marked buyers’
values are independent conditioned on the other values of the others. Then, one can use the results of Chawla et al.
[2014] and Yan [2011] to extract a fraction 1 − 1/e of the revenue extractable from them6.
F Missing proofs
F.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let M be the sequential posted price mechanism that draws for each i ∈ [n] a value pi uniformly at random
from the set S i = {vminπ,i 2k : k ∈ [⌈log(rπ,i) − 1⌉] ∪ {0}}. M proposes prices to the buyers in an arbitrary order, and offers
price pi to buyer i.
For i ∈ [n], let πi be the probability distribution of the ith coordinate of π. Note that |S i| does not exceed log(rπ,i).
Therefore the probability that pi is the highest possible value (among the values in S i) that does not exceed the value
drawn from πi, is at least 1/ log(rπ,i). More formally, let πS i be the uniform distribution on S ; then
Prvi∼πi ,pi∼πS i [pi ≤ vi ∩ (∄p′i ∈ S i : p′i > pi ∧ p′i ≤ vi)] ≤
1
log(rπ,i) .
Thus, with probability 1/ log(rπ,i), the mechanism extracts from buyer i a revenue of exactly vi,min2k, where k is the
number such that the value drawn from πi lies in between vi,min2i and vi,min2i+1. This implies that with probability
1/ log(rπ,i) the mechanism extracts from buyer i a revenue that lies a factor of at most 1/2 away from vi. This leads to
the conclusion that
E~v∼π[revenue of M(~v)] ≥
∑
i∈[n]
1
log(rπ,i)
1
2
Evi∼πi [vi]
≥ 1
2 log(max{rπ,i : i ∈ [n]})
∑
i∈[n]
Evi∼πi [vi]
=
1
2 log(max{rπ,i : i ∈ [n]})E~v∼π[OPT (~v)],
where OPT (~v) = ∑i∈[n] vi denotes the optimal social welfare when the buyers have valuation vector ~v. 
F.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. The second claim has been already proved in the proof sketch. It remains to prove the first claim. To this
aim, let us first introduce some specialized notation: Let σ now be a probability distribution on a finite subset of R≥0
and x ∈ supp(σ), we write precσ(x) to denote max supp(σ) ∩ [0, x) if supp(σ) ∩ [0, x) is non-empty. Otherwise, if
supp(σ) ∩ [0, x) = ∅, we define precσ(x) = 0. Similarly, we write succσ(x) to denote min supp(σ) ∩ (x,∞]. (We leave
succσ(x) undefined if supp(σ) ∩ (x,∞] is empty.)
Suppose now that A is an optimal dominant strategy IC, ex-post IR mechanism. For~v ∈ supp(π), denote by x(~v) the
expected allocation vector output by A when the buyers report valuation vector ~v (so that for i ∈ [n], the value xi(~v) is
6We acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for pointing out this simple algorithm
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the probability that i gets allocated service, when the buyers report ~v) and denote by p(~v) the vector of expected prices
charged by A when the buyers report ~v. Ex-post incentive compatibility states that
∀i ∈ [n],~v−i ∈ supp(π−i), (vi, v′i) ∈ supp(πi)2 : vixi(vi,~v−i) − pi(vi,~v−i) ≥ vixi(v′i ,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i),
and ex-post individual rationality states that
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : vixi(vi,~v−i) − pi(vi,~v−i) ≥ 0.
The next lemma states that, in A, the allocation probability for a buyer is non-decreasing in his reported valuation.
Lemma 5. For all i ∈ [n], all ~v−i ∈ π−i, and all vi, v′i ∈ supp(πi,~v−i), with vi < v′i , it holds that
xi(vi,~v−i) ≤ xi(v′i ,~v−i).
Proof. By way of contradiction, we assume that ǫ = xi(vi,~v−i) − xi(v′i ,~v−i) > 0. By ex-post incentive compatibility it
holds that
vixi(vi,~v−i) − pi(vi,~v−i) ≥ vixi(v′i ,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i),
v′i xi(v′i ,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i) ≥ v′i xi(vi,~v−i) − pi(vi,~v−i).
We now rewrite these inequalities as
vixi(vi,~v−i) − vixi(v′i ,~v−i) ≥ pi(vi,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i),
v′i xi(vi,~v−i) − v′i xi(v′i ,~v−i) ≤ pi(vi,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i).
This results in the following pair of inequalities.
viǫ ≥ pi(vi,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i),
v′iǫ ≤ pi(vi,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i).
The two inequalities contradict each other, because v′i > vi and we assumed ǫ > 0. 
The next lemma upper bounds the prices charged by A.
Lemma 6. For all i ∈ [n], all ~v−i ∈ supp(~v−i) and all vi ∈ supp(πi,~v−i), it holds that
pi(vi,~v−i) ≤ vixi(vi,~v−i) −
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i<vi
(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)xi(v′i ,~v−i). (9)
Proof. For v′i ∈ supp(πi,~v−i) the ex-post IC constraint for ~v−i, v′i , precπi,~v−i (vi) can be written as
v′i(xi(v′i ,~v−i) − xi(v′′i ,~v−i)) ≥ pi(v′i ,~v−i) − pi(v′′i ,~v−i),
where v′′i = precπi,~v−i (vi). Summing the above over all v
′
i ∈ supp(πi,~v−i), v′i < vi yields (9). 
The optimal revenue among all ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanisms (and thus the expected revenue of A) can be
written as the following linear program, where (x(~v))~v∈supp(π) and (p(~v))~v∈supp(π) are the variables:
max
{∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
pi(~v)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (10)
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : vixi(~v) − pi(~v) ≥ 0 (11)
∀i ∈ [n], (vi, v′i) ∈ supp(πi)2,~v−i ∈ supp(π−i,vi) : vixi(vi,~v−i) − pi(vi,~v−i) ≥ vixi(v′i ,~v−i) − pi(v′i ,~v−i) (12)
∀~v ∈ supp(π) :
∑
i
xi(~v) ≤ k (13)
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : 0 ≤ xi(~v) ≤ 1
}
(14)
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In the above linear program, (11) are the ex-post IR constraints, (12) are the ex-post IC constraints, and (13) expresses
that the service cannot be provided to more than k buyers.
By Lemma 5, it is possible to add to the above linear program the constraints xi(vi,~v−i) ≥ xi(precπi,~v−i (vi)) for
i ∈ [n],~v−i ∈ supp(π−i), vi ∈ supp(πi,~v−i). Moreover, by Lemma 6, replacing the objective function by
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
vixi(vi,~v−i) −
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i<vi
(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)xi(v′i ,~v−i)

and removing the constraints (11) and (12) results in the following linear program that upper bounds the optimal
revenue among the ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanisms:
max
{∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
vixi(vi,~v−i) −
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i<vi
(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)xi(v′i ,~v−i)

∣∣∣∣∣∣ (15)
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : xi(~v) ≥ xi(precπi,~v−i (vi),~v−i) (16)
∀~v ∈ supp(π) :
∑
i
xi(~v) ≤ k (17)
∀i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π) : 0 ≤ xi(~v) ≤ 1
}
(18)
We will show that the linear program (3–6) is equivalent to the above. Set yi(~v) = xi(~v) − xi(precπi,~v−i (vi),~v−i) for
all i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π), and observe that the constraints (16), (17) and (18) are then equivalent to (4), (5) and (6)
respectively. Moreover, with this correspondence between y and x, we can rewrite the objective function as follows:
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
vixi(vi,~v−i) −
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i<vi
(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)xi(v′i ,~v−i)

=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
πi,~v−i(vi)vixi(vi,~v−i)
−
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
πi,~v−i (vi)
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i<vi
(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)xi(v′i ,~v−i)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
πi,~v−i(vi)vixi(vi,~v−i)
−
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
xi(vi,~v−i)(succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i > vi]
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
xi(vi,~v−i)(πi,~v−i(vi)vi − (succπi,~v−i (vi) − vi)Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i > vi])
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
xi(vi,~v−i)(Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i ≥ vi]vi − (succπi,~v−i (vi))Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v′i > vi])
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
(xi(vi,~v−i) − xi(precπi,~v−i (vi),~v−i))viPrv′i∼πi,~v−i [v
′
i ≥ vi]
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v
′
i ≥ vi]viyi(vi,~v−i).
This completes the proof. 
F.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Proof. We will show that the expected revenue of Mkπ is at least
2 − √e
4
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi∈supp(πi,~v−i )
Prv′i∼πi,~v−i [v
′
i ≥ vi]viy∗i (vi,~v−i),
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which is by Theorem 1 and the objective function (3) a (2 − √e)/4 fraction of the expected revenue of the optimal
ex-post IC, ex-post IR mechanism.
For a vector of valuations ~v ∈ supp(π) and a buyer i ∈ [n], denote by Di,~v−i the probability distribution from
which mechanism Mkπ(~v) draws a price that is offered to buyer i, in case iteration i ∈ [n] is reached (as described
in Definition 11). We let V be a number that exceeds max{vi : i ∈ [n],~v ∈ supp(π)} and represent by V the option
where Mkπ(~v) chooses the “do nothing”-option during iteration i, so that Di,~v−i is a probability distribution on the set
{V} ∪ {vi : y∗i (vi,~v−i) > 0}. Let us formulate an initial lower bound on the expected revenue of Mkπ.
E~v∼π[revenue of Mkπ(~v)]
= E ~v∼π,
p1∼D1,~v−1 ,
...
pn∼Dn,~v−n

∑
i∈[n]
pi1[pi ≤ vi]1[|{ j ∈ [i − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]

=
∑
i∈[n]
E ~v∼π,
p1∼D1,~v−1 ,
...
pn∼Dn,~v−n
[
pi1[pi ≤ vi]1[|{ j ∈ [i − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]
]
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
p1∈supp(D1,~v−1 )
...
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i )
pi1[pi ≤ vi]1[|{ j ∈ [i − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]
∏
j∈[i]
D j,~v− j (p j)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i )
: pi≤vi
piDi,~v−i (pi)
∑
p1∈supp(D1,~v−1 )
...
pi−1∈supp(Di−1,~v−(i−1) )
: |{ j∈[i−1]|p j≤v j}|<k
∏
j∈[i−1]
D j,~v− j (p j)
=
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i )
: pi≤vi
piy∗i (pi,~v−i)
2
Pr p1∼D1,~v−1
...
pi−1∼Di−1,~v−(i−1)
[|{ j ∈ [i − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]
≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i )
: pi≤vi
piy∗i (pi,~v−i)
2
Pr p1∼D1,~v−1
...
pn−1∼Dn−1,~v−(n−1)
[|{ j ∈ [n − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k].
(19)
For the second equality, we applied linearity of expectation; the third equality follows from the definition of expected
value; to obtain the fourth inequality we eliminate the indicator functions by removing the appropriate terms from the
summation; in the fifth inequality we substitute Di,~v−i (pi,~v−i) and D j,~v− j (p′j,~v− j) by concrete probabilities. For the last
inequality we lower bounded the last probability in the expression by replacing i by n.
For ~v ∈ supp(π) and i ∈ [n− 1], let us denote by z~vi the probability that a price drawn from Di,~v−i does not exceed vi,
i.e.,
z~vi =
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i ) : pi≤vi
Di,~v−i (pi) =
∑
v′i∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : v′i≤vi
y∗i (v′i ,~v−i)
2
,
and let X~vi denote the random variable that takes the value 1 with probability z~vi and the value 0 with probability 1 − z~vi .
Then the final probability in the derivation above, i.e.,
Pr p1∼D1,~v−1
...
pn−1∼Di−1,~v−(n−1)
[|{ j ∈ [n − 1] : p j ≤ v j}| < k]
can be written as
1 − Pr

∑
i∈[n−1]
X~vi ≥ k
 .
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Let µ = E
[∑
i∈[n−1] X~vi
]
. Next, we use a Chernoff bound:
Theorem 7 (Chernoff bound (as in [Motwani and Raghavan, 1995]).). Let X1, . . . , Xn be independent random (0, 1)-
variables such that, for i ∈ [n], Pr[Xi = 1] = pi where pi ∈ [0, 1]. Then, for X = ∑i∈[n] Xi, µ = E[X] = ∑i∈[n] pi and
any δ > 0,
Pr[X ≥ (1 + δ)µ] ≤
(
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
)µ
.
This implies that the expression above is bounded as follows.
1 − Pr

∑
i∈[n−1]
X~vi ≥
(
1 +
(
k
µ
− 1
))
µ
 ≥ 1 −
(
ek/µ−1
(k/µ)k/µ
)µ
.
By the definition of z~vi and constraint (5) of the linear program, it holds that µ =
∑
i∈[n−1] z~vi ≤ k/2. We can lower bound
the expression above by replacing µ by k/2. To see this, rewrite it first into the following:
1 −
(
ek/µ−1
(k/µ)k/µ
)µ
= 1 − e
k−µ+k ln(µ)
kk
.
The derivative of the exponent of e (with respect to µ) is positive for µ ∈ [0, k], which means that the exponent of e is
increasing in µ on [0, k]. Thus, replacing µ by its upper bound k/2 increases the exponent and therefore decreases the
expression above. Therefore:
1 − Pr

∑
i∈[n−1]
X~vi ≥ k
 ≥ 1 −
(
e
4
)k/2
≥ 1 −
(
e
4
)1/2
=
2 − √e
2
. (20)
Continuing from (19), we obtain
E~v∼π[revenue of Mkπ(~v)] ≥
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i ) : pi≤vi
pi
y∗i (pi,~v−i)
2
2 − √e
2
=
2 − √e
4
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v∈supp(π)
π(~v)
∑
pi∈supp(Di,~v−i ) : pi≤vi
piy∗i (pi,~v−i)
=
2 − √e
4
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
vi,pi∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : pi≤vi
πi,~v−i(vi)piy∗i (pi,~v−i)
=
2 − √e
4
∑
i∈[n]
∑
~v−i∈supp(π−i)
π−i(~v−i)
∑
pi∈supp(πi,~v−i ) : pi≤vi
Pr~v−i∼πi,~v−i [vi ≥ pi]piy
∗
i (pi,~v−i),
which proves the first of the two claims. For the second claim, observe that (20) states a lower bound of (2 − √e)/2
on the probability that all players get selected by the mechanism. Therefore, we can combine (20) with the principle
explained in Remark 1, which allows us to transform Mkπ into a dominant strategy IC blind offer mechanism ˆMkπ.
Observe now that (19) is still a lower bound on the revenue of ˆMkπ so that the revenue analysis of Mkπ also holds for
ˆMkπ. 
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